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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Appellate jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78A-4-103(2)0) as this is an appeal from a final district court judgment that
was transferred here from the Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL

This appeal raises three issues. The need to resolve the second and third
issues is dependent in each instance on the outcome of the previous issue. If the
Court reverses the district court's judgment based on the first issue, it need not
reach the second; and if it reverses on the second, it need not reach the third.
1.

The district court abused its discretion by declining to enforce the

parties' stipulation to apply a 10% prejudgment interest rate after:
a.

The parties agreed to the rate in a court-approved stipulated

jury instruction to which all objections were waived;
b.

The court withdrew the instruction upon the express

agreement the court would make the calculation automatically; and
c.

The court articulated the calculation would be made using

the approved and agreed 10% rate, with no objection from any party.
2.

The district court incorrectly failed to apply the 10% prejudgment

interest rate of Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-1 to negligence-based choses in action,
contrary to the controlling case law of this Court and the Supreme Court.

3.

The district court abused its discretion by applying a low 2015 post-

judgment interest rate when prejudgment interest began running in 2007.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW

1.

"Normally,' a district court's decision to enforce a stipulation is

reviewed for an abuse of discretion."' State v. Beckstrom, 2013 UT App 186, if 12
n.5, 307 P.3d 677 (quoting Prinsburg State Bank v. Abundo, 2012 UT 94, if 10,296

•

P.3d 709) .
2.

The application of the legal rate in Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-1 as

prejudgment interest for negligence-based property damage choses in action is a
legal question reviewed for correctness. See Francis v. National DME, 2015 UT
App 119, ,r 21,350 P.3d 615 ("When our review requires us to examine statutory
language, we look first to the plain meaning of the statute and then review [the]
district court's interpretation of a statute for correctness.") (construing Utah
Code Ann.§ 15-1-1) (citation and quotations omitted).
3.

If the district court had discretion to decide the appropriate rate of

interest to use, review of discretionary decisions is for abuse of that discretion.

See Mercado v. Hill, 2012 UT App 44, ,I 8, 273 P.3d 385.
PRESERVATION BELOW

The issues presented were preserved in the trial court. (R. 1599-1600, 1631,
1689, 1702, 1711, 1742-47, 1750-51, 1759-67, 1772-81, 1792-97, 1799-1933, 1950-51;
1969, at 68-73; 1971; 1973; Addendum Exhibits 1-8.)
2
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RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISION

The following statutory provision is implicated by the second issue raised
in this appeal, if the Court reaches that issue:
Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the
legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or
chose in action shall be 10% per annum.
Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-1(2) (2013). Prior versions of the statute are attached as
Addendum Exhibit 9.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This appeal asks the Court to apply the proper rate of prejudgment
interest to a jury award for property damage based on negligence. The
defendants stipulated to using the 10% statutory legal interest rate, then reneged
once the verdict went against them. The district judge let the defendants out of
their stipulation, then applied a 2.27% post-judgment rate when entering final
judgment.
This brief discusses the proper prejudgment interest rate by addressing
successive dependent issues presented for review. If the Court reverses on any
issue presented, it need not address any succeeding issue.
The first issue is whether this Court should enforce a stipulation reached
between the parties that a 10% prejudgment interest rate applied to the
prejudgment interest award. This stipulation was entered after the parties had
already agreed to a jury instruction containing that rate. The instruction was
3

•

withdrawn on the express agreement that the court would automatically
calculate prejudgment interest if the jury awarded property damages. The court
articulated on the record the parties' understanding that the 10% calculation
would be made by the court, and no party objected. The jury then awarded
property damages as contemplated by the stipulation and ruling. The district
court nevertheless declined to enforce the rate agreed to by stipulation. This
Court should enforce the stipulation by reversing and remanding for entry of a
judgment applying the agreed 10% rate.
If, however, the Court declines to enforce the stipulation for whatever

reason, it should nevertheless conclude that the applicable rate for prejudgment
interest in this case is the statutory legal rate of 10% from Utah Code Ann. § 151-1. Both this Court and the Supreme Court hold that this rate applies to
negligence-based claims like those on which the jury awarded property
damages in this case. Thus, if the Court reaches this issue, the Court should
reverse and remand for entry of a judgment applying the 10% statutory
prejudgment interest rate.
If the Court decides not to enforce the stipulation and also determines not

to use the statutory legal rate of interest, the Court should reverse and remand
for use of an appropriate rate of interest reflective of the forbearance of payment
in this case. The district court used a low 2015 post-judgment interest rate
without any explanation or justification. The interest rate should be reflective at
4

•
least of the rates in place when interest began running, which were significantly
higher than the one used by the district court. The district court also eschewed
case law using a "middle ground" rate. Case law using a post-judgment interest
rate does not apply here, and the district court exceeded its discretion in
applying it.
Under any of these approaches, this Court should reverse and remand.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW

This case went to trial on the plaintiffs' claims for failure of the defendant

•

insurance agents to put in place adequate insurance coverage for them. (R. 123036; 1969, at 87-131.) The plaintiffs suffered six-figure property damage in a fire,
only to discover their agents had put in place a mere $3,000 of insurance despite
their request for full coverage. (R. 1230-36, 1864, 1930; 1969, at 128; Pis.' Trial
Exs. 18, 21-24.) The plaintiffs sued in contract and tort. (R. 1230-36.)
On the first day of trial, the parties submitted stipulated jury instructions
that included an instruction on prejudgment interest. (R. 1599-1600, 1631.) The
rate agreed to in the instruction was 10%. (R. 1631.) The district court approved
the instruction and included it in the final set to be given to the jury. (R. 1689,
1702; 1969, at 68, 70.)
Before the instruction was given, the defendants asked to withdraw the
instruction and replace it with a stipulation that prejudgment interest would be
awarded on the same basis as a matter of course by the district court if the jury
5

•

returned a verdict for the plaintiffs on its claim for personal property damage.

(R. 1969, at 70-73.) The plaintiffs agreed. (R. 1969, at 72-73.) The district judge
accepted the stipulation, articulated specifically that the 10% calculation would
be used, and stated his approval of the amount. (R. 1969, at 72-73.) No party
objected to this ruling. (R. 1969, at 73.) The jury then returned a verdict for the
plaintiffs awarding damages for the value of lost property based on agent
negligence and negligent misrepresentation. (R. 1733-34.)
After trial, the plaintiffs moved for entry of judgment on the verdict to
include prejudgment interest of 10%. (R. 1742-47.) Notwithstanding their prior
stipulation, the defendants opposed the motion on grounds they had not
stipulated to such an award. (R. 1759-67.) They also argued for the first time that
a different interest rate should apply, though they did not propose any different
rate. (R. 1763-65.)
Following a hearing on the matter, the district court issued a
memorandum decision stating that no stipulation had been reached with respect
to an absolute award of prejudgment interest. (R. 1792-97; 1971.) The court then
asked for simultaneous supplemental briefing on an award of prejudgment
interest in the absence of a stipulation. (R. 1796; 1972, at 2-3.) In its supplemental
brief, the defendants proposed for the first time that the court use Utah's postjudgment interest rate as the prejudgment interest rate in this case. (R. 1808-10.)

6

At the hearing following the submission of supplemental briefs, the
district court, acting sua sponte, partially reversed its prior memorandum
decision after listening to the recorded stipulation from the trial. (R. 1973, at 112.) The court ruled that the parties had in fact reached a binding stipulation
with respect to the award of prejudgment interest, and ordered it to run from
June 13, 2007. (R. 1973, at 12-13.) The court declined, however, to use the 10%
rate previously agreed to by the parties and approved by the court. (R. 1973, at
20.) Instead, the court decided to apply the 2015 post-judgment interest rate of
2.27%. (R. 1973, at 20-21.) The court gave no explanation for this choice. (R. 1973,
at 20.) The court then entered judgment for the plaintiffs using this rate for the
prejudgment award. (R. 1950-51.)
The plaintiffs have appealed the district court's interest rate
determination. (R. 1954-55.) This is the sole focus of this appeal. The defendants
have not cross-appealed with respect to any portion of the judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiffs are David and Ruth M. Fuller, husband and wife, and their
wholly owned small business, Fuller's Appliance Parts and Service, LLC, a Utah
limited liability company (collectively the "Fullers"). (R. 1230.) The Fullers
purchased insurance on their home, business, and vehicles through Denise
Bohne (pronounced "Bonnie") and Western States Insurance Agency of Spanish

7

Fork, Utah ("Western States"). (R. 1230-32.) They sought full coverage for all of
their personal and business property. (R. 1231; 1969, at 91.)
On February 3, 2007, a fire destroyed the Fullers' home in Springville,
Utah, where their business was located. (R. 1232.) The Fullers made claim on the
business insurance coverage that Bohne and Western States had purportedly
put in place for them, only to find they were significantly underinsured. (Pls.'
Trial Exs. 21-24, 26.) After receiving a check for $3,000 as the sum total of the
insurance coverage in place, the Fullers sued Bohne and Western States. (R. 1,
1230, 1864; 1969, at 128; Pis.' Trial Ex. 18.)
The Fullers demonstrated at trial, inter alia, that Bohne and Western States
(hereafter collectively "Western States" or the "Western States defendants"
unless otherwise indicated) had placed the Fullers' signatures on insurance
applications without the Fullers' knowledge and had used them to obtain
coverage different in kind and amount than that which the Fullers had
requested. (R. 1969, at 96-102, 114-15; Pis.' Trial Exs. 1, 58-61; Defs.' Trial Ex. 29.)
The Fullers sought damages for breach of the defendants' duties as insurance
agents, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, and negligent misrepresentation. (R. 1230-36, 1733-34.) The damages
alleged included the value of business equipment, inventory, and tools lost in
the fire, and prejudgment interest on this lost personal property. (R. 1230-36,
1702, 1733-34; 1969, at 68-73; Pls.' Trial Exs. 21-24.) The Fullers also claimed lost
8

rental value from the loss of use of their home. (R. 1734; R. 1969, at 128-29; Pis.'
Trial Ex. 56.)
The Fullers contemporaneously catalogued and detailed their property
damages in inventories that were submitted at trial as Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 22
(Personal Property Inventory) and supported further by Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibits
21 (Proof of Loss), 23 (Inventory of Parts), and 24 (Appliances for Sale). All
property damages related to lost equipment, tools, and inventory. (Pls.' Trial
Exs. 21-24.)
On the first day of trial, the parties stipulated to certain legal instructions
to be given to the jury. (R. 1599-1600.) These included Instruction No. 29, which
provided as follow:
Prejudgment Interest

The Fullers seek recovery of prejudgment interest as part of their
loss. In Utah, prejudgment interest may be awarded in situations where
the damage is complete, the loss can be measured by facts and figures,
and the amount of loss is fixed as of a particular time. If you find for the
Fullers on their claim of prejudgment interest, you should award them
10% annually on the value of their proven loss from the date of the fire to
the date of your verdict.
(R. 1631 & Addend. Ex. 2.) Western States agreed this was an accurate statement
of the law and stipulated to its contents. (R. 1969, at 68, 70, 1702 & Addend. Exs.
3-4.) The district court approved the instruction, included it in the final
instructions, and was prepared to give it to the jury. (R. 1969, at 70, 1702;
Addend. Exs. 3-4.)
9

Shortly before the jury was instructed, Western States asked the court to
withdraw this instruction and have prejudgment interest decided by the trial
court. (R. 1969, at 70-72 & Addend. Ex. 4.) When the Fullers balked at this
request, Western States, under questioning from the court, confirmed the
addition of prejudgment interest to an award of property damages would be
automatic if the jury in fact awarded personal property damages. (R. 1969, at 7172.) The offer was given in exchange for removing a third line from the special
verdict form allowing the jury to award the Fullers prejudgment interest in
addition to property damages and rent damages. (R. 1734; 1969, at 69-73.) The
Fullers accepted this offer and the trial court agreed to this approach. (R. 1969, at
72-73.) The court then articulated on the record the understanding that the
interest would be calculated by the court at 10% per annum, as per the
previously stipulated jury instruction, and that the court was "fine" with this
amount. (R. 1969, at 73.) No party objected to the court's decision. (R. 1969, at
73.)
The relevant portions of the transcript reflect first the specific stipulation
between the parties to the substance and content of the final jury instructions,
including Instruction No. 29, which contained the 10% interest rate as the rate to
be applied in the case:
THE COURT: So this is a full and complete set? Yes?
MR. BARRETT [Counsel for Western States]: It is, Your Honor.
10

MR. CHRISTIANSEN [Counsel for the Fullers]: Yes, Your Honor.
(R. 1969, at 70; see also R. 1689-1710.) Then, after stipulating to the instructions,
Western States spontaneously proposed withdrawing Instruction No. 29 and
having the court simply apply prejudgment interest automatically if property
damages were awarded. (R. 1969, at 70-71.) The record reflected the offer,
acceptance, and district court approval, and articulation of the stipulation to
apply the 10% rate with no objection from any party:
MR. BARRETT: Your Honor, if we can, we were having discussion
about whether the special verdict form should allow, in addition to a
damage line for property as well as a damage line for rent, whether it
should also have prejudgment interest. And during the break, I was able
to look at the MUJI, Model Utah Jury Instructions, Second Edition, special
verdict form CV 1899, and it is in the context of a fraud instruction, which
is a variation of the negligent misrepresentation, so I realize it's not
particularly analogous, but in this, it indicates that counsel should specify
the type of damages, in this case economic and non-economic. Our case,
there are no non. And damages so the judge can calculate prejudgment
interest. Your Honor, I would prefer that that remain the situation here.
THE COURT: Let me ask Mr. Christiansen. So, I mean, you're
asking for it, but I - my experience has always been the opposite. Where
I'm - if there is a dispute, I can - I mean, if there's no dispute MR. CHRISTIANSEN: We've got an instruction in on it.
THE COURT: We can strike the instruction.
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Well, but I want the jury to decide whether
they're - whether the plaintiffs are entitled to prejudgment interest.
You're not saying the Court would make that determination.
THE COURT: Well, are you - is there any argument about whether
MR. BARRETT: No 11

•
•

THE COURT: -- they' re entitled to prejudgment interest?
MR. BARRETT: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. BARRETT: If there's a property damage MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Okay.
MR. BARRETT: - there's going to be prejudgment interest THE COURT: Right, so you' re - it - your - they' re MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Then I'm okay with that.
THE COURT: Right. Exactly.
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: (Inaudible).
THE COURT: I didn't- I didn't- it's - we're on the same page. I
don't see that there's a disagreement about whether they're entitled to it
or not. What I'll do is, it's in there, and when we get to it, instruct them to
just strike it out, that the Court will - well, just strike that out, that that's
no longer a part of the instructions. And you can tell them that.
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Okay. Can we take that instruction out
completely from the jury?
THE COURT: Just rip out instruction 29.
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And I'll tell them that we're skipping that, that was a
potential we skipped over. How's that?
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Okay. Excellent. Thank you.
THE COURT: All right, so take it out- look, part of me - it's a
simple calculation, so I really didn't care much, because it's a 10 percent

12

•
calculation and you can do it in your head. I also don't think as I said,
there's any - it's - the amount is fine. But as a technical matter, this is the
better approach.
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Yep. Okay, so jury instruction 29 is withdrawn.
(R. 1969, at 70-73 & Addend. Ex. 5; see also R. 1711.)
After deliberations, the jury returned a verdict for the Fullers and against
both defendants jointly and severally. (R. 1733-34 & Addend. Ex. 6; R. 1969, at
64-65.) The jury found Bohne and Western States had breached their duties as
agents and made negligent misrepresentations to the Fullers that had caused
them damage. (R. 1733-34.) The jury awarded $101,585 to the Fullers for the
value of their lost personal property. (R. 1734.) The jury did not award any
rental damages. (R. 1734.)
After trial, the Fullers moved for entry of judgment on the verdict. (R.
1742-47.) Consistent with the prior stipulation reached with Western States, the
Fullers included prejudgment interest of 10% from 2007 to the time of entry of
the judgment. (R. 1745-46, 1751.)
At this point, notwithstanding its prior stipulation, Western States
opposed inclusion of prejudgment interest in the judgment. (R. 1763-65.) The
Western States defendants argued (1) they had not stipulated; (2) no
prejudgment interest was appropriate; and (3) the 10% rate did not apply. (R.
1763-65.)
13

•

The district court held a hearing that included addressing this issue. (R.
1971.) The district judge observed: "I have a specific recollection of sitting here
as we were going through that, that it struck me that there was a stipulation,
and that I was a little surprised, actually, Mr. Barrett, that that wasn't - that you
were just saying, fine, it applies to everything." (R. 1971, at 14-15.) The district
judge further observed: "I need to go back and listen to the tapes at this
portion," referring to the recordings of the trial colloquy. (R. 1971, at 14.)
Western States' counsel argued that it had not been his intent to stipulate to a
10% rate to be applied to all claims on the property damages and that the jury's
findings on the tort claims left "a little bit of a muddy water." (R. 1971, at 14.)
On January 6, 2015, the district court issued a memorandum decision
ruling that the stipulation did not conclusively decide the prejudgment interest
issue. (R. 1792-97 & Addend. Ex. 7.) Citing the "prejudgment interest statute,"
Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-1, as well as the common law, the court ruled that

•

prejudgment interest was in fact awardable for negligence claims and that
Western States had conceded as much at the hearing. (R. 1795 n.4.) The Court
also acknowledged the effect of the law incorporated into Jury Instruction No.
29, which awards prejudgment interest "where the damage is complete, the loss
can be measured by facts and figures, and the amount of loss is fixed as of a
particular time." (R. 1796.) Nevertheless, the court ruled that while "some of
those determinations may be made based on the jury's verdict," "some of those
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determinations have yet to be made." (R. 1796.) The Court therefore asked for
simultaneous supplemental briefing to be able to make all such remaining
determinations. (R. 1796; 1972, at 2-3.)
The parties submitted simultaneous supplemental briefs. (R. 1799, 1829.)
The court then held a hearing following supplemental briefing. (R. 1973.) At the
hearing, the court on its own motion partially reversed its prior written decision,
concluding that the parties had in fact stipulated to the automatic inclusion of
prejudgment interest if the jury were to find for the Fullers on property damage.

(R. 1973, 1-12.) The district judge indicated that he had gone back and listened
again to the recording of the h·ial colloquy: "It appears to me, having gone back
and listened to the tape very carefully, Mr. Barrett, you did stipulate to the
availability [of prejudgment interest]. And to the extent that your arguments go
to the lack of availability, I think that they've been stipulated away." (R. 1973, at
1-2.) The court replayed portions of the trial colloquy recording in chambers in
the presence of counsel and reaffirmed this preliminary ruling. (R. 1973, at 7-

12.)1 The court determined that "there was a stipulation as to the entitlement of
prejudgment interest, and that it was based on that stipulation that Mr.
Christiansen withdrew instruction 29." (R. 1973, at 12.) The court concluded that

Although the transcript suggests this was a telephonic hearing, the hearing
actually took place in open court and involved counsel and the court recessing
to the judge's chambers together to listen to portions of the prior trial recording.
(R. 1973, at 7.)

1
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"to the extent anything in my memorandum decision is inconsistent with ...
this ruling, I'm vacating that portion of the memorandum decision." (R. 1973, at
12.)

The district judge then took the question of the proper prejudgment
interest rate under advisement and scheduled a conference call later that day to
announce his ruling. (R. 1973, at 18.) During the subsequent conference call (R.
1973, at 19), the judge announced his ruling without elaboration: "I am

convinced that the post judgment rate is appropriate, not the 10 percent rate in
this matter." (R. 1973, at 20 & Addend. Ex. 8.) The court then awarded the 2015
post-judgment interest rate of 2.27% as prejudgment interest. (R. 1973, at 20-21.) 2
The district court entered judgment on the verdict on February 24, 2015.
(R. 1950-51 & Addend. Ex. 1.)3 The judgment included prejudgment interest of
2.27% from June 13, 2007, to the date of enh·y of the judgment. (R. 1951.) The

Fullers timely appealed the interest rate decision. (R. 1954.) Bohne and Western
States have not cross-appealed any portion of the judgment.

See Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-4(3)(a);
http://~ww.utcqurts.gov/rcsourcQ_s/_intratcs/intcn~sh·atcs.htm.

2

Judgment was entered by the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler, as Judge Himonas
had by that point stepped down from the trial bench to take his seat on the
Supreme Court. (R. 1950.)

3
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

This Court should reverse and remand with an order that an amended
judgment be entered in favor of the Fullers with prejudgment interest calculated
at 10% per annum. The district court's post-trial rulings with respect to this
issue were erroneous.
First, the district court abused its discretion by refusing to fully enforce
the parties' stipulation. The parties stipulated to, and the district court
approved, the use of the 10% prejudgment interest rate in connection with the
agreed jury instructions. Western States therefore waived any objection to the
use of a different rate. Furthermore, the parties agreed to withdrawal of the jury
instruction in exchange for an automatic calculation by the court in the event the
jury awarded property damages - which the jury in fact awarded. The court
articulated the agreed understanding on the record that the calculation would
take place using the 10% rate agreed to by the parties. There was no objection to
this articulation because that in fact reflected the parties' understanding; any
objection was therefore waived. The lower court should have held the Western
States defendants to their agreement when they reneged after losing the jury
verdict. The court abused its discretion by failing to do so. Stipulations will be
enforced by the courts, act as an estoppel against a party seeking to change its
mind, and are conclusive of all matters necessarily included in the stipulation.
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This Court should reverse the decision below and fully enforce the parties'
stipulation.

If the Court reverses based on Western States' stipulation and waiver, it
need not reach any further issue. Otherwise, the Court should address the
applicability of the 10% prejudgment interest rate in Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-1.
Under a long line of cases beginning with the Supreme Court's decision in Fell v.

Union Pacific RR, 88 P. 1003 (Utah 1907), and continuing on with Uinta Pipeline
Corp. v. White Superior Co., 546 P.2d 885 (Utah 1976), and through to the present,
the Utah appellate courts hold that the rate for prejudgment interest in nonpersonal-injury negligence cases is the legal rate currently found in Utah Code
Ann.§ 15-1-1(2). The use of that rate has been affirmed by this Court as recently
as five months ago in Francis v. National DME, 2015 UT App 119,350 P.3d 615.
Language found in two Supreme Court decisions in other contexts neither
overrules Fell nor provides binding or persuasive contrary direction to the
longstanding jurisprudence of this state. Nor do federal cases cited by Western
States. If the Court reaches this issue, it should reverse and remand for entry of
an amended judgment using the 10% statutory rate in Section 15-1-1.
Lastly, if the Court does not enforce the parties' stipulation and also
determines not to apply the legal rate, the Court should nevertheless reverse
and remand. The district court chose to apply the post-judgment interest rate
applicable in 2015 to interest that began to run in 2007. The court gave no
18

rationale for its decision. This is a significant discount off the prevailing rate at
the time prejudgment interest began to run. It also ignores "middle ground"
rates used by the federal courts and opts instead for a low rate used in case law
interpreting and applying statutes not at issue here. If the Court does not
reverse on other grounds, the Court should reverse and remand with
instructions to apply a rate that articulates the reasons why and approximates
the loss to the Fullers based on their forbearance on the money they lost.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO
ENFORCE THE PARTIES' ENTIRE STIPULATION ON
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST, INCLUDING THE AGREED 10% RATE.

Prior to instructing the jury, the parties stipulated to the instructions to be
given, and the court approved the law. This included Jury Instruction No. 29,
which read:
Prejudgment Interest

The Fullers seek recovery of prejudgment interest as part of their
loss. In Utah, prejudgment interest may be awarded in situations where
the damage is complete, the loss can be measured by facts and figures,
and the amount of loss is fixed as of a particular time. If you find for the
Fullers on their claim of prejudgment interest, you should award them
10% annually on the value of their proven loss from the date of the fire to
the date of your verdict.

(R. 1631, emphasis added.) Western States agreed this was an accurate statement
of the law and stipulated to its contents. (R. 1969, at 68, 70, 1702.) The district
court approved and was prepared to give the instruction. (R. 1969, at 70, 1702.)
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As the jury instructions were about to be given, Western States suggested
that prejudgment interest should be awarded by the judge and need not be a
part of the jury's deliberations. (R. 1969, at 70-71.) Western States sought
ostensibly to remove an opportunity for the jury to award more damages to the
Fullers and to eliminate an additional line from the special verdict form that was
to be included for that purpose. (R. 1969, at 68-70.) The Fullers initially resisted
this request and sought to have the jury instructed as agreed. (R. 1969, at 71-72.)
At that point, however, Western States offered to stipulate that the prejudgment
interest that would otherwise be instructed to the jury would simply be added
on to the amount awarded by the verdict. (R. 1969, at 72.) It was only after
receiving confirmation from Western States and the court that this would
happen in an automatic fashion, as offered by Western States via stipulation,
that the Fullers agreed. (R. 1969, at 72-73.) As evidenced by the colloquy at trial,
the Fullers in no way would have agreed otherwise. (R. 1969, at 68-73.) The
district court articulated the understanding that the rate would be automatically
applied at 10%, and no party objected. (R. 1969, at 73.)
Western States subsequently sought to renege on this stipulation and
catch the Fullers in a "gotcha." The Western States defendants argued that they
did not agree to prejudgment interest, that no prejudgment interest should be
awarded and that, if it was, it should be at some other rate than that agreed to in
Jury Instruction No. 29. (R. 1763-65.)
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The district court originally agreed with Western States. (R. 1795-96.)
However, upon further review, the district court confirmed that Western States
had in fact stipulated to an award of prejudgment interest as the Fullers had
argued. (R. 1973, at 1-12.) At that point, the lower court should have enforced
the stipulation by its terms, including the agreed 10% rate. Instead, the court
enforced only part of the stipulation and overlooked the rate previously agreed
to by the parties and approved by the judge himself. This ruling should be
reversed for three independent reasons.
First, Western States waived any objections to the rate by stipulating to

the substance of Jury Instruction No. 29. "Generally, if a party fails to object to a
jury instruction, that party waives any objection thereto." Walker v. Hansen, 2003
UT App 237,

,r 17, 74 P.3d 635. Western States stipulated to the instruction

containing the 10% rate and thereby waived any objection to it. Nothing about
the subsequent colloquy with the Court "undid" that waiver with respect to the
agreed rate. Indeed, there was no discussion whatsoever about potentially using
a different rate in withdrawing the instruction. The Fullers were entitled to rely
on the fact that this was a settled issue and that any objection had been waived.
Second, the parties reached an express stipulation on the record, in open

court, that the prejudgment interest standard reflected in the instruction would
be enforced as per the instruction. The district court approved the stipulation,
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•

articulated that the interest calculation would be automatic, articulated the

•

usage of the 10% rate, and approved the rate itself:
THE COURT: Well, are you - is there any argument about whether

•

MR. BARRETT: NoTHE COURT: -- they're entitled to prejudgment interest?

MR. BARRETT: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right.

MR. BARRETT: If there's a property damage MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Okay .

•

MR. BARRETT: - there's going to be prejudgment interest -

THE COURT: ... I don't see that there's a disagreement about
whether they're entitled to it or not. ...

THE COURT: ... [I]t's a simple calculation, so I really didn't care
much, because it's a 10 percent calculation and you can do it in your head.
I also don't think as I said, there's any - it's - the amount is fine ....

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Yep. Okay, so jury instruction 29 is withdrawn.

(R. 1969, at 71-73.)
The Supreme Court and this Court both hold that such a stipulation
settles the issue and should not be subject to later collateral attack:
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"A stipulation is an admission which may not be disregarded or set
aside at will." Generally, stipulations are binding on the parties and the
court. Thus, a stipulation entered into by the parties and accepted by the
court acts as an estoppel upon the parties thereto and is conclusive of all
matters necessarily included in the stipulation." ... [S]uch contract if
lawful has ... all the binding effect of findings of fact and conclusions of
law made by the court." Further, while [a] court may modify its findings,
... it cannot change or modify a contract of the parties."
II

11

Thus, when a court adopts a stipulation of the parties, the issues to
which the parties have stipulated become" settled" and "not reserved for
future consideration." ...

Prinsburg State Bank v. Abundo, 2012 UT 94, ,r,r 13-14, 296 P.3d 709 (citations
omitted). Accord State v. Beckstrom, 2013 UT App 186, ,r 9,307 P.3d 677 (citing
and quoting Prinsburg State Bank).
Unless a party shows by timely motion that the stipulation was "entered
II

into inadvertently" or that it should be set aside for justifiable cause," the
stipulation will be enforced. Prinsburg State Bank, 2012 UT 94,

,r 14; Beckstrom,

2013 UT App 186, ,r 11. The Western States defendants made no such showing
below. They did not move to set aside the stipulation at all, let alone on a timely
basis. Instead, they allowed the Fullers to rely on the stipulation, withdraw
Instruction No. 29, submit the case to the jury, obtain a verdict, and move for
entry of judgment based on the verdict, all in reliance on the stipulation and
prior court ruling. At that point, they then opposed the entry of judgment based
on what should have been the settled issue of the rate, not by moving to set
aside the stipulation but rather by arguing they had never entered into the
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stipulation. (R. 1763-65.) They failed to meet the criteria set forth by both of this

•

State's appellate courts that must be met before a party can get out of a binding
stipulation.
The 10% interest rate was "necessarily included in the stipulation" and
therefore conclusive of the issue. The rate had already been settled by
stipulation and order. The parties were merely adjusting the manner by which
the stipulated rate would be implemented. There was absolutely no discussion
about using a different rate, undoing the prior stipulation with a new
stipulation, or throwing the matter back open for debate and possible different
outcome. Had there been, the Fullers would never have agreed to it. As it
stands, Western States subsequently played fast and loose with the stipulation,
taking advantage of the circumstances to seek and obtain a different result. This
was at the expense of the Fullers, who engaged honestly and openly in a
discussion about a requested procedural change to awarding prejudgment
interest- not a substantive change to the award - only to be told by the district
court thereafter that they had lost substantial ground as a result. 4 This Court
should reverse that error, which was an abuse of the district court's discretion
under the circumstances here presented. The lower court's failure to
acknowledge or apply the Pringsburg/ Beckstrom criteria for enforcing a

The defendants' bait-and-switch approach cost the Fullers approximately onethird the value of the total judgment. (R. 1745-46, 1750-51, 1950-51.)

4

24

stipulation exceeded the permitted range of discretion. See Wilson v. IHC

Hospitals, Inc., 2012 UT 43,

~

52 n.15, 289 P.3d 369 ("Atrial court abuses its

discretion if it commits legal error."); Rivera ex rel. Rivera v. State Farm Mut. Auto.

Ins. Co., 2000 UT 36, ~ 7 n.2, 1 P.3d 539 (a trial court abuses its discretion if its
ruling exceeded the range of discretion allowed for the particular act under
II

review"). 5
Despite the Fullers' earnest attempts to enforce the stipulation, the trial
judge waxed and waned on how clearly he could remember the substance of the
stipulation at the time he was initially called upon to enter a final judgment. 6
The court first thought it was clear: "I have a specific recollection of sitting here
as we were going through that, that it struck me that there was a stipulation,
and that I was a little surprised, actually, Mr. Barrett, that that wasn't - that you
were just saying, fine, it applies to everything." (R. 1971, at 14-15.)
Notwithstanding this "specific recollection," the court subsequently ruled that
there had been no absolute stipulation on prejudgment interest. (R. 1795-96.)
Three weeks later, the court suggested it had listened to a portion of the trial
recording and recognized there had in fact been a stipulation (R. 1973, at 1-12),

Abuse of discretion" does not imply that the trial court intentionally violated
applicable standards, see Rivera, 2000 UT 36, ~ 7 n.2, and the Fullers do not
suggest any such thing here.
6 No written transcript had yet been made of the proceedings, so the judge was
working from memory, aided by the briefing of the parties and the digital
recording from the trial. (R. 1795-96; 1971, at 14-15; 1973, at 1-12.)
5

11
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but failed to comprehend and implement the totality of the stipulation. This was
reversible error.
The Fullers had diligently worked jointly with Western States before trial
even began to agree to the substance of stipulated jury instructions, and the
prejudgment rate had been a settled issue by the first trial day. (R. 1318, 1599,
1631.) The district court specifically approved the rate, both when approving the
jury instruction (R. 1702; 1969, at 70) and again when approving the stipulation:
"[I]t's a simple calculation, ... it's a 10 percent calculation and you can do it in
your head .... [T]he amount is fine." (R. 1969, at 73.) The 10% rate issue was
"settled" and "not reserved for future consideration." Prinsburg State Bank v.

Abundo, 2012 UT 94, ,r 14,296 P.3d 709. Western States' "admission" was
"binding," and the Western States defendants should have been "estopped"
from challenging the issue further. See id.

,r 13.

Third, Western States failed to timely object to the use of the 10% rate at
the time of the stipulation. This Court should reject the belated objection to the
10% rate. If the Western States defendants believed the effect of their stipulation
was something other than what the court said it was - "a 10 percent calculation
and you can do it in your head" - they had the obligation to raise a timely
objection at that point. See 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72,

,r 51, 99

P.3d 801. They did not. Instead, their silence equaled consent and they waived
any objection after the Fullers relied on their agreement - even though the
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district court later agreed to revisit the issue. Cf United States v. Wardell, 591 F.3d
1279, 1309-10 (10 th Cir. 2009) (untimely objection insufficient even if raised
subsequently in district court).
On this record, and given the governing law, the district court abused its
discretion by undoing the waiver to the substance of the initial instruction,
refusing to fully enforce the stipulation, and ignoring the waiver of the use of
the articulated rate. This Court should reverse the imposition by the district
court of any rate other than the 10% rate agreed to by the parties. The Court
should remand the case to the district court with instructions to enter an
amended judgment containing a prejudgment interest rate of 10%. The Court
need not reach the second or third issues in this brief.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT INCORRECTLY REFUSED TO USE THE
LEGAL RATE FOR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST OF 10%.

If for whatever reason this Court does not recognize the Western States
defendants' waiver of a challenge to the 10% rate or enforce the parties'
stipulation as agreed, the Court should nevertheless hold that the 10% legal rate
is the appropriate prejudgment rate required to be used here.
A.

The District Court Incorrectly Failed to Apply the Governing
Rule from Fell v. Union Pacific RR and Uinta Pipeline Corp.

The district court's failure to apply the 10% legal rate in Utah Code Ann.
§ 15-1-1(2)

ignores and conflicts with controlling precedent. See Fell v. Union Pac.

RR, 88 P. 1003, 1007 (Utah 1907); Uinta Pipeline Corp. v. White Superior Co., 546
27

P.2d 885, 887-88 (Utah 1976). This Court's own recent case law suggests the
statute applies when awarding prejudgment interest for a "chose in action" in
the absence of a contrary agreement. See Sundial Inc. v. Villages at Wolf Hollow

Condo. Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc., 2013 UT App 223, 'if 8,310 P.3d 1233. This is but
one in a long line of cases correctly interpreting this statute. These and related
cases will be discussed further herein.
The statute reads as follows:
Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the
legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or
chose in action shall be 10% per annum.
Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-1(2). This Court "look[s] first to the plain meaning of the
statute and then review[s] [the] district court's interpretation of a statute for
correctness." Francis v. National DME, 2015 UT App 119, 'if 21,350 P.3d 615
(citation and quotations omitted).
Section 15-1-1(2) embodies the "legal rate" of interest. Sundial, 2013 UT
App 223, 'if 8. This section or its substantively similar predecessors have been in
Q

place in Utah since the late 1800s. See Fell v. Union Pac. RR, 88 P. 1003, 1007 (Utah
1907) (citing Revised Statutes§ 1241 (1898)); Addend. Ex. 9 (tracing statute's
history from 1898 to the present). 7

Pre-1953 versions of the statute were obtained electronically from the Utah
Government Digital Library (digitaUibrary.utah.gov) through the portal of the
Utah Courts website (utcg_urts.gov /!<!~_library/ research/ utah.a~p). For a history
7

28

From the beginning, the Supreme Court has held that the statute "is
general, allowing interest in all cases at the legal rate, in the absence of an
agreement" if prejudgment interest is to be awarded. Fell, 88 P. at 1007. Over
time, the rate within the statute has changed, but the substance and application
have remained consistently the same. See Uinta Pipeline, 546 P.2d at 887 (noting
the "landmark" Fell case "has been followed in Utah many times"). The most
recent rate change went from 6% to 10% effective May 14, 1981. See SCM Land

Co. v. Watkins & Faber, 732 P.2d 105, 108-09 (Utah 1986); Utah Code Ann.§ 15-11(3); Addend. Ex. 9, at 13-14.
In the Sundial decision, this Court followed the longstanding
interpretation of this jurisdiction in reading the statute to mean that unless
parties stipulate to a different rate of interest by contract, the statutory rate of
10% set forth in Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-1 applies to the forbearance of monies
owed on a "chose in action." See Sundial, 2013 UT App 223, ,r 8. Specifically, the
Court's plain-language interpretation of the statute is that "'the legal rate of
[prejudgment] interest for ... any ... chose in action shall be 10% per annum."' Id.
(quoting Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-1(2)).
A "chose in action" is '"a claim or debt upon which a recovery may be
made in a lawsuit."' Id. (quoting Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 1999
of territorial laws on interest, see Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-1 compiler's note,
attached as Addendum Exhibit 9, at 12.
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UT 49,

,r 9,980 P.2d 208 (quoting Barron's Law DictionanJ 71 (3d ed. 1991))). The

negligence-based tort claims in this case are undoubtedly choses in action, as
was the unjust enrichment claim advanced in Sundial. (R. 1233, 1235, 1733-34.)
The "legal rate" prescribed by Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 is therefore the rate to be
used when awarding prejudgment interest in such matters, unless the parties
agree to a different rate. See, e.g., Fell v. Union Pac. RR, 88 P. 1003, 1007 (Utah
1907) (prejudgment interest at statutory legal rate awarded in negligence case
resulting in damage to property); Error v. Western Home Ins. Co., 762 P.2d 1077,
1080 (Utah 1988) (noting prejudgment interest of 10% awarded by trial court on
damages and expenses for rebuilding home after insurer failed to pay policy
coverage for fire); Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 302,
308 (Utah 1983) (prejudgment interest at agreed contract rate of 10% awarded on
negligent misrepresentation claim); Vali Convalescent & Care Insts. v. Division of

Health Care Fin., 797 P.2d 438,445 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (noting Section§ 15-1-1
establishes the rate if a plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest).
The rule identified by this Court in Sundial traces its roots back to the
Supreme Court's seminal decision in Fell v. Union Pacific RR, 88 P. 1003 (Utah
1907). Fell was an action filed against a railroad for damage to livestock. The
defendant's negligence caused the death of certain sheep in transit and the
shrinkage in weight of others. See id. at 1003. The Supreme Court affirmed the
district court judge in concluding that the plaintiff was entitled to recover
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prejudgment interest. See id. at 1005-07. The Court then concluded that
prejudgment interest was properly awarded at the statutory legal rate on
property damages caused by negligence. See id. The Court observed that "[o]ur
statute (section 1241, Rev. St. 1898) is general, allowing interest in all cases at the
legal rate, in the absence of an agreement." Id. at 1007.
In 1922, the Supreme Court noted that "[t]he doctrine laid down in [Fell
and related case Kimball v. Salt Lake City, 90 P. 395 (Utah 1907)] has been the law
of this jurisdiction for more than 15 years, and has been followed many times by
this court. Both the bench and the bar of this state should therefore be well
acquainted with those decisions and should regard the question as settled."

Bingham Coal & Lumber Co. v. Board of Educ., 211 P. 981,984 (Utah 1922). By the
time of its decision in Uinta Pipeline Corp. v. White Superior Co., 546 P.2d 885
(Utah 1976), the Court observed that the "landmark" Fell case "ha[d] been
followed in Utah many times." Uinta Pipeline, 546 P.2d at 887 (collecting cases). 8

See, e.g., Kimball v. Salt Lake CihJ, 90 P. 395, 397 (Utah 1907) (awarding
prejudgment interest at the legal rate for damage to real property); San Pedro,
L.A. & S.L.R. Co. v. Board of Educ., 99 P. 263,267 (Utah 1909) (damage to real
property); Wheatley v. Oregon Short Line RR, 162 P. 86, 87 (Utah 1916) (damage to
personal property); Wilson v. Salt Lake CihJ, 174 P. 847, 850-51 (Utah 1918)
(quantum meruit); Baker Lumber Co. v. A.A. Clark Co., 178 P. 764, 770-71 (Utah
1919) (municipal obligation); St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. Love, 195 P. 305,311
(Utah 1921) (wrongful attachment); Bingham Coal & Lumber Co. v. Board of Educ.,
211 P. 981,984 (Utah 1922) (breach of contract); Gillespie v. Blood, 17 P.2d 822,825
(Utah 1932) (action on recovery of bonds).

8
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In the 1976 decision of Uinta Pipeline Corp. v. White Superior Co., 546 P.2d
885 (Utah 1976), the plaintiff sued after the defendant's negligent conduct
resulted in property damages. See id. at 886. The Supreme Court affirmed a jury
verdict for the plaintiff, then turned to the question of prejudgment interest on
the award. See id. at 886-87. Citing Fell, the Court observed that "prejudgment
interest is allowable for the destruction or damage to personal property." Id. at
887. After concluding the plaintiff was entitled to prejudgment interest on the
award, the Court "remanded with directions to increase the amount of
judgment by the amount of interest accrued from date of damage to date of
judgment calculated at the legal rate." Id. at 888 (emphasis added). The rule in

Fell and Uinta Pipeline has continued to be followed since and remains good law
down to the present day. 9

See, e.g., Jack B. Parson Constr. Co. v. State, 552 P.2d 107, 109 (Utah 1976) (citing
Uinta Pipeline and Fell in awarding prejudgment interest for breach of contract
"in conformity with the prior decisions of this court"); Bjork v. Apr. Indus., Inc.,
560 P.2d 315,317 (Utah 1977) (breach of contract); Anderson v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co., 583 P.2d 101, 104 (Utah 1978) (breach of insurance contract); Lignell v.
Berg, 593 P.2d 800,809 (Utah 1979) (breach of contract); Canyon Country Store v.
Bracey, 781 P.2d 414,422 (Utah 1989) (lost profits; prejudgment interest denied
under Fell test) ("This Court has repeatedly stated the law in Utah as it applies
to prejudgment interest"); Smith v. Linmar Energy Corp., 790 P.2d 1222, 1226
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) (damage to real property; prejudgment interest denied
under Fell test); Lefavi v. Bertoch, 2000 UT App 5, ,r 24,994 P.2d 817 (tort and
contract claims); Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 2003 UT App 201, ,r,r 64, 90, 71 P.3d
188 (breach of contract; remanding for imposition of prejudgment interest at the
"appropriate statutory rates"); Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, ,r 17, 82
P.3d 1064 (tort and contract claims); Encon Utah, LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraemer, LLC,
2009 UT 7, ,r,r 50-55, 210 P.3d 263 (breach of contract); Stevensen 3rd E., LC v.
9
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Under the Fell decision and its considerable progeny, the" general statute"
now codified as Section 15-1-1 provides the "legal rate" to apply when awarding
prejudgment interest if the parties have not otherwise agreed to a different rate.

See Fell, 88 P. at 1007; Sundial, 2013 UT App 223, ,r 8. The statute has consistently
been interpreted this way. See, e.g., Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Division of State

Lands & ForestnJ, 886 P.2d 514,529 (Utah 1994) (Bench, J., concurring and
dissenting) ("Utah law establishes the rate of prejudgment interest '[e]xcept
when parties to a lawful contract agree on a specified rate"') (quoting Utah
Code Ann.§ 15-1-1 (1992)) (additional citation and quotation omitted), abrogated

on other grounds by State ex rel. Sch. & Institutional Trust Land Admin. v. Mathis,
2009 UT 85,223 P.3d 1119. Simply put, Section 15-1-1 is" applicable to
prejudgment interest generally." Id. (Bench, J., concurring and dissenting).
Indeed, the district court in the instant case referred to Section 15-1-1 as the
"prejudgment interest statute," and the Western States defendants conceded
below the predicate that "prejudgment interest may be awarded in negligence
actions to recover for damages to property." (R. 1795 n.4.) This Court holds that
once that predicate is established, the legal rate applies. See Vali Convalescent &

Care Ins ts. v. Division of Health Care Fin., 797 P.2d 438,445 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)

Watts, 2009 UT App 137, ,I 55, 210 P.3d 977, 991 (breach of fiduciary duty;
prejudgment interest denied under Fell test).
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(noting if plaintiff "is entitled to interest on some valid basis§ 15-1-1 establishes
the rate of interest to which it is entitled). 10
This Court should apply the 10% rate in Section 15-1-1(2). It applies on its
face. It applies per Fell and Uinta Pipeline and a host of other decisions. It applies
also because the parties specifically agreed to use a 10% interest rate for these
choses in action in their court-approved stipulation - which is a "lawful
contract" whereby they agreed to a specified rate. See Utah Code Ann.§ 15-11(2) ("Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest ... ");

Prinsburg State Bank v. Abundo, 2012 UT 94, ,i 13,296 P.3d 709 (referring to a
stipulation between litigants as an enforceable" contract"); Sllpra Part I. The
district court's refusal to use the statutory legal rate is reversible error under the
law and the facts of this case.
B.

The District Court Incorrectly Looked to Inapposite Cases.

As noted, the Fell line of decisions applying the legal rate as the
prejudgment interest rate has been the law in Utah since 1907. This Court has
continued that line of decisions by looking to the statutory 10% rate in Utah
The Fell rule applies to property damage cases caused by negligence, but not
to personal injury cases. See Bjork v. April Indus., Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah
1976) (reciting the common law rule prohibiting prejudgment interest in
personal injury cases). The Utah Legislature statutorily abrogated the common
law prohibition against prejudgment interest for personal injury damages by
enacting legislation now codified at Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-824. That section
authorizes prejudgment interest on personal injury judgments and sets a special
calculable rate that currently may not exceed 10%. No party to this case has
argued that Section 78B-5-824 applies here.
10
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Code Ann.§ 15-1-1(2) as the applicable legal rate for prejudgment interest on
choses in action such as those in this case. The district court's decision would
break the line of cases and call into question the framework for awarding
prejudgment interest in Utah. This Court should put a halt to any such
attempted diversion.

1.

Supreme Court language from other contexts does not govern.

The district judge apparently hesitated to follow the Fell decision because
of "individualized dicta" from one Supreme Court case that was later invoked
in a second Supreme Court case dealing with prejudgment interest for statutory
damages. (R. 1973, at 13-16.) The holdings from those cases do not control the
circumstances here, and neither should any dicta expressed therein.
To understand that dicta, this Court needs to understand the two
Supreme Court cases invoked (Consolidation Coal and Wilcox); a Supreme Court
precursor to those two cases (SCM Land); and a decision by this Court from
earlier this year discussing the Supreme Court's case law in context (National
DME). Each will be discussed next, in chronological order.

In SCM Land Co. v. Watkins & Faber, 732 P.2d 105 (Utah 1986), the Supreme
Court used the legal rate in Section 15-1-1 to add prejudgment interest to an
award for breach of a lease agreement. See id. at 108-09. The dispute in the case
was whether to apply Section 15-1-l's statutory interest rate in effect at the time
of the breach (10%) or in effect at the time the contract was entered (6% ). See id.
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There was no dispute, however, whether Section 15-1-1 supplied the proper
prejudgment rate. The Court determined that the rate in effect at the time the
contract was entered was the proper one and ruled accordingly. See id. at 109.
Next, in Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Division of State Lands & ForestnJ, 886
P.2d 514 (Utah 1994), abrogated by State ex rel. Sch. & Institutional Trust Land

Admin. v. Mathis, 2009 UT 85,223 P.3d 1119, the Supreme Court determined that
a higher rate than the statutory legal rate should apply to a coal consortium's
breach of a lease agreement with the State's School & Institutional Trust Land
Administration. Instead of applying Section 15-1-l's then-prevailing statutory
legal rate of 6%, the Court instead applied a rate prescribed by State regulations
governing the use of State lands, which went as high as 15 %. See Consolidation

Coal, 886 P.2d at 524-25 & n.15. The Court reached its decision based on "the
specific constitutional requirement that the State obtain full value for its school
trust lands, in conjunction with the legislature's broad grant of authority to the
[State] and our case law indicating that the [State] has such further implied
powers as are reasonably necessary to carry out its constitutional duties." Id. at
527. The Court further noted that the terms of the lease made it "expressly
subject to the laws of Utah," including the State interest rate regulations upon
which the Court relied. Id. at 528.
While writing for the majority in Consolidation Coal, Chief Justice
Zimmerman dropped a footnote in which he expressed in dicta a personal view
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that the legal rate in Section 15-1-1 should not apply as the prejudgment rate in
all breach of contract matters, which he thought the Court's SCM Land decision
had seemed implicitly to suggest and which he found to be reflected as well in
Court of Appeals jurisprudence:

The author of this opinion has serious reservations about the initial
correctness and therefore the continued vitality of SCM Land and any
other case that purports to tie prejudgment interest rates in all contract
cases to the section 15-1-1 rate in effect at the time the contract was signed.
See, e.g., Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 731-32 (Utah Ct. App.
1990). The plain language of section 15-1-1 seems to indicate that the
section was intended to apply only to a "loan or forbearance" of "money,
goods or chose in action." Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-1. In other words, it
provides a default interest rate when the parties have failed to specify an
interest rate for "the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in
action that is the subject of their contract." Id. The subject of the present
contract is the sale of mineral rights, not a loan or forbearance. This was
also the case in SCM Land. That opinion adopted its view of section 15-11's applicability without discussing the limiting language of that section.
Nevertheless, because the State has failed to raise this issue and its
resolution is not necessary for a disposition of this case, we decline to
address it.

Consolidation Coal Co, 886 P.2d at 525 n.13.
Judge Bench from this Court, sitting by designation in Consolidation Coal,
filed a concurring and dissenting opinion in which he challenged what he called
Justice Zimmerman's "individualized dicta" as contrary to established case law
in Utah:
Chief Justice Zimmerman's individualized dicta attacking this wellestablished line of cases is unfounded. Justice Zimmerman suggests that
because the contracts were for the sale of goods (mineral rights), they are
not a "loan or forbearance." Justice Zimmerman misapprehends the
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purpose of section 15-1-1 and prejudgment interest. Prejudgment interest
is designed to compensate the nonbreaching party that finds itself, by
virtue of the breach, in the position of loaning money or forbearing what
is owed by the breaching party. See 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages§ 82 (1988); see
also L & A Drywall, Inc. v. Whitmore Constr. Co., 608 P.2d 626, 630 (Utah
1980) (prejudgment interest represents interest on amount awarded as
damages due to party's failure or delay in paying amount under contract);
Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301,304 (Utah Ct.App.1987) (prejudgment
interest is that interest owed on overdue debt from date debt became
overdue until entry of judgment). Therefore, because of the
underpayment of royalties by Consol, the State found itself in the position
of loaning or forbearing money it was owed.

Id. at 529 n.1 (Bench, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Bench also pointed
out that "Utah law establishes the rate of prejudgment interest '[e]xcept when
parties to a lawful conh·act agree on a specified rate."' Id. at 529 (Bench, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (quoting Trail Mountain Coal Co. v. Division of State

Lands & ForestnJ, 884 P.2d 1265, 1273 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), affdin part, rev'din
part, 921 P.2d 1365 (Utah 1996), (quoting Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-1 (1992)). He
further noted that Section 15-1-1 is" applicable to prejudgment interest
generally." Id. ((Bench, J., concurring and dissenting).
Then, in Wilcox ·u. Anchor Wate, 2007 UT 39, 164 P.3d 353, the Supreme
Court determined Section 15-1-l's legal rate did not apply to a statutory
voidable preference recovery. The liquidator of an insolvent insurance company
sued under the Utah Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation Act (the
"Liquidation Act") to void a preferential $3.5 million payment. See id.

1 1. The

Liquidation Act did "not specify the rate of prejudgment interest applicable to
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judgment obtained under its voidable preference provisions." Id.

,r 42. The

Court held that, "when filling in gaps or interpreting ambiguous provisions of
the Liquidation Act, we look to the preference provisions of federal bankruptcy
law, which have the same purpose as the preference provisions of the
Liquidation Act." Id. ,I 47; see also id. ,I 11 (noting same). The Court therefore
concluded that, "when calculating the prejudgment interest on remand, the
district court should use the rate applied by the majority of federal courts to
judgments obtained in federal preference actions." Id. ,I 47. The rate used by the
majority of federal courts in that instance was the federal post-judgment interest
rate. See id. ,I 47 n.55 (collecting cases).
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court rejected the application of the
10% legal rate in Section 15-1-1(2) to voidable preference actions under the
Liquidation Act. See id.

iliI 42-46. The Court looked to Justice Zimmerman's

individualized dicta in Consolidation Coal to do so:
The theoretical underpinning behind section 15-1-1 is that the parties to a
lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for the loan or
forbearance of money, goods, or causes of action that are the subject of
their contract. Only when the parties to a contract fail to specify a rate of
interest does the default rate specified in section 15-1-1(2) apply. But this
case is not a conh·act action. There was no contract between Anchor Wate
and the Liquidator and therefore no opportunity for the parties to agree
upon an applicable rate of interest. The Liquidator's judgment is not
grounded on any voluntary undertaking by Anchor Wate. Rather, it is the
result of the statutory power given the Liquidator as he attempts to fulfill
his statutory mandate of achieving an equitable distribution of SAIC' s
estate. And there is nothing to suggest that the default interest rate
specified in section 15-1-1(2) is consistent with this statutory mandate.
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This court has previously expressed the view that the interest rate
specified in section 15-1-1(2) does not necessarily even apply in all
contract cases. In Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Dfr.,ision of State Lands &
Forestry, we suggested, albeit in dicta, that we had "serious reservations
about ... [cases] that purport[] to tie prejudgment interest rates in all
contract cases to the section 15-1-1 rate" because this section was meant to
apply only to loans or forebearances in contract actions .

•

Just as the default rate specified in section 15-1-1(2) does not
automatically extend to all judgments obtained in contract cases, it does
not automatically apply to all judgments based on statute where the
legislature has failed to specify the applicable rate. And in this case, we
conclude that the more appropriate prejudgment interest rate is the one
applicable to preference claims under federal bankruptcy law.

Id.

,r,r 44-46. The Court found good policy reasons for its approach in the context

of the Liquidation Act's statutory voidable preference action:
Application of the federal rate will adequately compensate the estates of
insolvent insurers for the time value of money without creating an
incentive for insurance liquidators to delay prosecution of voidable
preference claims in order to obtain returns greater than they could have
reasonably expected to earn in the market. It will also more adequately
take into account the practical reality of defendants in preference actions
that, like Anchor Wate, dispose of the proceeds obtained from the estate
of the insolvent insurer in the ordinary course of business prior to the
liquidation of the insurer or the initiation of a preference claim by the
Liquidator. Such defendants lack the ability to invest the proceeds at all.
Under such circumstances, application of the default rate specified in
section 15-1-l(s) could be entirely punitive and, in fact, may unjustly
enrich other creditors at the expense of the preference defendant. In the
event that the Utah legislature prefers a rate of interest different from the
federal rate, it may amend the Liquidation Act to specify the applicable
rate.

•
Id.

,r 48.
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Most recently, in an opinion handed down earlier this year, Francis v.

National DME, 2015 UT App 119,350 P.3d 615, this Court recognized the
intersection of argument based on the Consolidation Coal/Wilcox dicta with the
holdings of Sundial and its predecessors. See id.

iJil 39-42. In National DME, the

trial court awarded 10% prejudgment interest under Section 15-1-1 for breach of

•

contract. See id. ,I 18. This Court affirmed. See id. ,I 44. However, because of
inadequate briefing by the appellant, the Court did not resolve the alleged
competing interpretations of Section 15-1-1 based on Consolidated Coal/Wilcox,
Judge Bench's concurring and dissenting opinion in Consolidated Coal, and the

Sundial line of cases. See id. But in affirming the 10% award, the Court made
several observations that obtain here.
First, the Court noted that its recitation of Section 15-1-l's language in

Sundial "implies that choses of action qualify for the statutory rate regardless of
whether a loan or forbearance is involved." Id. ,I 41. The Court suggested that
under this interpretation, '"loan or forbearance' applies only to the word
'money."' Id. That is the interpretation reflected in the Fell line of cases from
1907 forward, including the 2013 Sundial opinion.
Second, the Court observed that, although the question presented in

National DME was not presented to other courts, "section 15-1-1 has been
applied in other cases involving a chose in action instead of a loan or
forbearance." Id. (citing Encon Utah, LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraemer, LLC, 2009 UT 7,
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•

,r,r 50-55 & n.20, 210 P.3d 263 (affirming the trial court's application of section
15-1-1 to a breach of contract claim); Mont Trucking, Inc. v. Entrada Indus., Inc.,
802 P.2d 779, 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (same); Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d
301, 304 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (same)); see also id.

,r 43 ("The question of whether

an action must specifically be a 'loan or forbearance' was not at issue in either

Consolidation Coal or Sundial.").
Third, this Court observed: "We have found no case that squarely
addresses the correct interpretation of the phrase 'loan or forbearance of any
money, goods, or chose in action."' Id.

,r 43 (quoting Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-

1(2)). The Court likewise found no need to do so in National DME, and so
affirmed the trial court's imposition of a 10% statutory rate in that case. See id.

,r 44.
If this Court reaches the question, it should hold to the Sundial reading of
the statute: '"the legal rate of [prejudgment] interest for ... any ... chose in
action shall be 10% per annum.'" Sundial, 2013 UT App 223,

,r 8 (quoting Utah

Code Ann.§ 15-1-1(2)). The failure of a tortfeasor to timely compensate a
plaintiff for losses incurred is analogous to the loan or forbearance of money in a
contract case. As Judge Bench observed with respect to a contract breach,
"[p]rejudgment interest is designed to compensate the nonbreaching party that
finds itself, by virtue of the breach, in the position of loaning money or
forbearing what is owed by the breaching party." Consolidation Coal, 886 P.2d at
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•
529 n.1 (Bench, J., concurring and dissenting). The same rationale applies to
someone who is owed fixed property damages as a result of a tort. By delaying
payment on an amount calculable by facts and figures, the tortfeasor is
obtaining the benefit of the plaintiff's money as if it were a loan or in the nature
of forbearance on money owed. The interest rate in Section 15-1-1 applies to all
such forbearance "[e]xcept when parties to a lawful contract agree on a specified
rate." Id. at 529 (Bench, J., concurring and dissenting) (citations and quotations
omitted); see also Iron Head Constr. Inc. v. Gurney, 2009 UT 25, iJ 10, 207 P.3d 1231
(noting prejudgment interest" serves to compensate a party for the depreciating
value of the amount owed over time," which "would have been paid to
plaintiffs" in satisfaction of their claim but for the defendants' breach of duty)
(citations omitted).
In addition to the compelling points set forth in the analysis from Judge
Bench in Consolidation Coal, from this Court in Sundial, and from this Court again
in National DME, the Supreme Court's asides in Consolidation Coal and Wilcox are
readily and persuasively distinguished.
First, Justice Zimmerman's personal view, expressed in obiter dicta, was
just that. It was not a holding and did not purport even to express the view of a
majority of the Court. It was offered up without briefing or argument from
either side, and it failed to take into consideration Fell or its substantial
subsequent history and application. As Judge Bench pointed out in his
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•

dissenting and concurring opinion, Justice Zimmerman's musings were directly
contrary to long-established Utah law and misapprehended the nature and
purpose of the prejudgment interest statute. See Consolidation Coal, 886 P.2d at
529 n.1 (Bench, J., concurring and dissenting). His view carries little weight here.
Second, Consolidation Coal itself was unique. The Court concluded that the
then-prevailing statutory legal rate of 6% was insufficient given the State's
constitutional and statutory mandates to obtain "full value" from its lands. See

Consolidation Coal, 886 P.2d at 527. The Court thus felt compelled by what it
found to be different controlling law to use a higher rate. See id. at 524-25 & n.15.
Since the time it was first handed down, Consolidation Coal itself has been
abrogated, rendering it even more unhelpful to the discussion here. See State ex

rel. Sch. & Institutional Trust Land Admin. v. Mathis, 2009 UT 85,223 P.3d 1119.
Third, like Consolidation Coal, the Wilcox case was a policy-driven decision
implementing a remedial statutory mandate and statutory goals. On the
strength of its own established authority, the Court's interpretation of the
Liquidation Act looked to federal bankruptcy law rather than to Section 15-1-1.
See Wilcox, 2007 UT 39,

•

,r,r 11, 47. The Court relied heavily on the substantial

policy reasons behind using the federal post-judgment interest rate as a majority
of federal bankruptcy courts did. See id.

,r,r 47-48. Wilcox did not involve a tort

chose in action, let alone a negligence claim involving property damages like
Fell or Uinta Pipeline.
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Fourth, Wilcox bent the Co11solidation Coal dicta to its own purposes. In
doing so, the Court arguably stretched the earlier case's gratuitous statements
beyond acceptable tolerance limits. The Supreme Court recognized Justice
Zimmerman's observations in Consolidation Coal as obiter dicta but then applied
them as if they were holding. See Wilcox, 2007 UT 39, if if 45-46. The problem
with this approach is that the individualized dicta was unbriefed and untested
in the first instance. It was not the law of the land and should not have been
when appropriated by the Wilcox Court. As this Court correctly recognized in

National DME, the Supreme Court has not been squarely presented with the
question presented here. See National DME, 2015 UT App 119, ,r 41. The Court in

Wilcox was not - that case was a statutory claim that lent no discussion at all to
common law choses in action. See Wilcox, 2007 UT 39, ,r,r 42-48. In fact, two
years after Wilcox the Supreme Court affirmed an award of 10% prejudgment
interest using the h·aditional application of Section 1.5-1-1. See Encon Utah, LLC v.

Fluor Ames Kraemer, LLC, 2009 UT 7, ,r,r 50-55 & n.20, 210 P.3d 263.
Lastly - and perhaps most importantly - neither of the Supreme Court
cases containing equivocal language purported to overrule Fell or Uinta Pipeline,
or even address them. Those cases remain controlling law and dictate the result
here. The doctrine of stare decisis required the district court to follow binding
appellate precedent, and its failure to do so here calls for correction of error. See

Eldridge v. Johndrow, 2015 UT 21, iJ 20 & n.3, 345 P.3d 553.
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If the Court needs to reach this issue, the Court should conclude that the
statutory legal rate applies to prejudgment interest on this property damage
award. That was the holding of Fell, which has never been overruled. That is the
result in a long line of cases since Fell, including case law that post-dates Wilcox.
That is the correct holding here.
2.

Federal court cases do not govern.

In their supplemental briefing below, the Western States defendants
argued that, besides the Consolidation Coal/Wilcox pairing, "[o]ther Utah courts"
have declined to apply Section 15-1-l's rate to prejudgment interest in noncontract settings. (R. 1808.) Western States then cited, not to Utah courts at all,
but rather to federal courts exercising discretionary prerogative in setting a
prejudgment interest rate under federal case law. (R. 1808.)
The Western States defendants pointed to Judge Waddoups' short
Memorandum Decision and Order in Klein v. Patterson, No. 2:11-cv-723-CW,
2013 WL 5445949 (D. Utah, Sept. 30, 2013) (unpublished). Patterson was a
fraudulent transfer action in which the court-appointed receiver recovered a
judgment against a third party. See id. at *1. Judge Waddoups first awarded
prejudgment interest under Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-1(2) based on the receiver's
oral suggestion that "the section applies not just to contracts, but more broadly
to a chose in action." Id. He then reversed himself and ruled that "[w]hile the
statute does refer to a chose in action, it does so within the context of" a lawful
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contract." Id. The judge decided that a fraudulent transfer is not within the
realm of contract law, and he found no other Utah statute or federal law
providing a prejudgment interest rate for a fraudulent transfer judgment. See id.
Consequently, he relied on a prior Tenth Circuit receivership decision
ruling that "the prejudgment interest 'calculation rests firmly within the sound
discretion of the trial court."' Id. (citing Wing v. Gillis, No. 12-4071, 2013
U.S.App. LEXIS 10174, at *16, 2013 WL 2169321, 525 Fed. Appx. 795 (10th Cir.
May 21, 2013) (unpublished)). The Tenth Circuit's Order and Judgment in Gillis
had ruled that prejudgment interest was proper in a fraudulent transfer case
"[u]nder fairness and equity principles" because it "compensates for the loss of
use of the money" and avoids '"a windfall [to the defendant] in the form of an
interest-free loan."' Gillis, 525 Fed. Appx. at 801 (quoting William A. Graham Co.

v. Haughey, 646 F.3d 138, 145 (3 rd Cir. 2011)). Following the Tenth Circuit's lead,
Judge Waddoups used a 5% rate, which Gillis ruled was a matter of discretion
because there was "no federal statute setting forth an appropriate rate of
prejudgment interest." See Patterson, supra, at *2; Gillis, 525 Fed. Appx. at 801.
These two unpublished federal decisions are not binding upon this Court.
Indeed, the Tenth Circuit's Order and Judgment is not even binding precedent
in the Tenth Circuit. See Gillis, supra, at footnote "*". More importantly, though,
they are not persuasive. Judge Waddoups apparently ruled without the benefit
of briefing from the parties. He did not cite to Fell, Uinta Pipeline, or any state
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court case law. He did not consider the holdings of any Utah appellate court.
Instead, he latched onto language from Gillis that the rate was a matter of
discretion.
Unfortunately, the law in Gillis got lost in translation. (This is perhaps
why unpublished orders and judgment are not binding precedent.) Gillis itself
had cited to the published decision of Morrison Knudsen Corp. v. Ground

Improvement Techniques, Inc., 532 F.3d 1063 (10 th Cir. 2008). See Gillis, 525 Fed.
Appx. at 801. That case held quite clearly that "the law governing compensatory
damages also governs prejudgment interest." Morrison Knudsen, 532 at 1077
(rejecting the "'smorgasbord approach' created by allowing parties to pick and
choose prejudgment interest law") (citing Johnson v. Cont'l Airlines Corp., 964
F.2d 1059, 1064 (10 th Cir. 1992)). Thus, Utah law, not federal law, determines the
applicable rate for prejudgment interest under a Utah state law cause of action.
Nowhere does Utah law suggest that the awarding of prejudgment interest or
the application of the proper rate for state common law choses in action is a
matter of equitable discretion or of federal law.
To the contrary, the Tenth Circuit has previously recognized the viability
of the Uinta Pipeline/ Fell line of cases in determining prejudgment interest under
Utah law. See U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Touche Ross & Co., 854 F.2d 1223, 1255 (10 th Cir.
1988), overruled on other grounds as recognized by Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co.,
77 F.3d 1215, 1231 (10 th Cir. 1996). As already briefed at length, those Utah cases
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hold that the "legal rate" applies. See supra Part II.A. The "legal rate" is found in
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2). See Sundial, 2013 UT App 223,

,r 8.

If this Court is nevertheless persuaded by the two unpublished federal
decisions the Western States defendants cited, then the Court should use a 10%
rate as a matter of equitable discretion. There is authority for this approach as
well in the federal court case law. See Krum v. Hartford Life & Acc. Co., 942 F.
Supp. 2d 1171, 1186 (D. Utah 2013) (Shelby, J.) (awarding prejudgment interest
of 10% for improperly denied ERISA benefits under Utah Code Ann.§ 15-1-1).
Moreover, the equities of this case call for it. This case would have been over
long ago if the Western States defendants had stuck to their prior agreements
made on the record. Their bait-and-switch argument was a litigation tactic that
added insult to the Fullers' injuries already suffered at their hands. The Fullers
are now going on their ninth year of seeking redress for the harm caused by
Denise Bohne and Western States. The equities point to using the rate that was
originally agreed to by the parties, which the Western States defendants
subsequently wriggled out of by their legal maneuvering. See also infra Part III
(discussing appropriate rates in the event court discretion is invoked).
3.

A statute granting equitable discretion does not govem.

The other "Utah court" the Western States defendants pointed to below as

•

using its discretion was this Court. (R. 1809.) Western States argued that in

Peterson v. Jackson, 2011 UT App 113, ,r,r 56-58, 253 P.3d 1096, this Court
49

•

"affirmed the trial court's equitable decision to use the post-judgment rate in
§ 15-1-4 to calculate prejudgment interest in the statutory dissolution of a
privately held corporation." (R. 1809.) However, the statute at issue in Peterson,
Utah Code Ann.§ 16-l0a-1434, specifically provided that prejudgment interest
"may be allowed at the rate and from the date determined by the court to be
equitable." This Court therefore affirmed the use of the post-judgment rate in
Section 15-1-4 as "rational" and not an abuse of discretion. Id.

,r 58. No such

statute exists here. Peterson does not stand for the broad proposition that Utah
courts decide the prejudgment interest rate as a matter of equity for common
law choses in action. The viable Fell decision and its progeny are decidedly to
the contrary.
In sum, this Court should reject the case law invoked that falls outside the
contours of Fell and its progeny. Based on a correct application of the law, the
Court should reverse.

III.

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY APPLYING
THE 2015 POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST RATE TO PREJUDGMENT
INTEREST ACCRUING SINCE 2007. 11

Finally, if this Court rejects all of the Fullers' arguments to this point, the
Court should nevertheless reverse and remand with instructions. The district

This issue was preserved below by the Western States defendants' raising and
arguing it and by the district court's ruling on it. See Gressman v. State, 2013 UT
63, ,r 45,323 P.3d 998 (holding issues, not arguments, are preserved for appellate
review); R. 1808-10; R. 1973, at 19-21.

11
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court abused its discretion by applying the 2015 post-judgment interest rate to
prejudgment interest accruing since 2007. The lower court gave no rationale for
this decision; it simply announced it. (R. 1973, at 19-21.) This was an abuse of the
court's discretion. See Johnston v. Labor Comm'n, 2013 UT App 179, ,i 15,307 P.3d
615, cert. denied, 317 P.3d 432 (Utah 2013) (requiring a reasonable basis for a
discretionary decision to be upheld on appeal, and noting remand is
appropriate if one is not clear from the record).
As already argued, the Court should have used the rate agreed to
between the parties in the first place. See supra Part II.B.2. The Western States
defendants' change of heart cost the Fullers additional time and expense and
continues to do so. The most equitable rate to apply, if equitable discretion
comes into play, would be the 10% rate stipulated to before trial began and
again during the course of trial. The trial court exceeded its discretion when it
went away from that rate under these circumstances.
Alternatively, the district court's decision failed to take into account when
the interest began running. The difference between interest rates in 2007 and
2015 was substantial: in 2007 it was 6.99% per annum; in 2015 it was 2.27%. 12 To
apply the 2015 rate simply because that is when the judgment entered is wholly
arbitrary. If prejudgment interest is to be applied using a post-judgment rate, it

12

See Ji.tt12: // www. utcourts_~ov / resources;' it:i j:rate~Ljntercsb:ates.hbn.
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•

should at least be the rate in effect at the time the prejudgment interest began
running.
The district court's ruling failed to appreciate that the purpose of
awarding prejudgment interest is to replace what was lost in the interim period
after the wrongful conduct or breach:
"[A]n award of prejudgment interest simply serves to compensate a
party for the depreciating value of the amount owed over time and, as a
corollary, deters parties from intentionally withholding an amount that is
liquidated and owing." Trail Mountain Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands
& Forestn;, 921 P.2d 1365, 1370 (Utah 1996). "Plaintiffs are entitled to
damages for the loss of use of the money that, but for the [defendant]'s
breach and ensuing delay, would have been paid to plaintiffs in
satisfaction of their ... claim." Kraatz v. Heritage Imps., 2003 UT App 201,
,r 75, 71 P.3d 188 (alterations in original) (citing Castillo v. Atlanta Cas. Co.,
939 P.2d 1204, 1212 (Utah Ct.App.1997)).

Iron Head Constr. Inc. v. Gurney, 2009 UT 25, ,r 10, 207 P.3d 1231. That cannot be
accomplished in this case by using a low rate that came into effect years after the
tortious conduct and bears no resemblance to market rates at the time.
Even the cases Western States cited from the federal courts declined to use
the post-judgment rate. See Patterson, supra; Gillis, supra. Each of those applied a
5% rate as a "middle ground" between the positions taken by the litigants as a
matter of fairness and equity. By failing to do the same here, the district judge
below eschewed even the cases the Western States defendants presented to him.
Lastly, the post-judgment interest rate used in the Wilcox decision was
decided in that context as a matter of statutory interpretation by looking to
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analogous federal bankruptcy law. See Wilcox, 2007 UT 39, ,I,r 11, 47-48. If what
the district court did here was follow Wilcox's lead on the appropriate rate, that
decision was misguided: the instant case presents none of the statutory or policy
issues presented in Wilcox.
If the Court reaches this point in the analysis, it should reverse and

remand for further proceedings to determine an interest rate that is fair and
equitable under all the circumstances. The lower court's use of the 2015 postjudgment interest rate was an abuse of discretion under all the circumstances.

See Johnston, 2013 UT App 179, ,r 15; Gullickson v. Gullickson, 2013 UT App 83,

,r 39,301 P.3d 1011 (a court abuses its discretion when it fails "to exercise sound,
reasonable, and legal decision-making") (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 11 (9 th
ed. 2009)).
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the district court's
decision and remand with an order that prejudgment interest should be applied
using the 10% legal rate agreed to by the parties and dictated by statute. If the
Court disagrees, it should nevertheless reverse the district court's decision and
remand with an order to consider and articulate the appropriate interest rate
that should apply under all the circumstances of this case.
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Stephen K. Christiansen (6512)
311 South State Street, Suite 250

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801.716.7016
Facsimile: 801.716.7017
steve@skclawfirm.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR

SALT LAKE COUNTYCSTATE OF UTAH
~~~--.

•

DAVID AND RUTH M. FULLER AND
FULLER'S APPLIANCE PARTS AND
SERVICE. LLC,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
DENISE BOHNE AND WESTERN STATES
INSURANCE AGENCY,
Defendants.

----~·

JUDGMENT
Civil No. 100901093
Honorable Deno Himonas

This case having been tried to a jury, and the jury having returned a verdict in favor of
the plaintiffs and against the above-named defendants on October 30, 2014, and the Court now
being fully advised,
JUDGMENT is hereby ENTERED in favor of plaintiffs David Fuller, Ruth M. Fuller,
and Fuller's Appliance Parts and Service, LLC, and against defendants Denise Bohne and
Western States Insurance Agency, Inc., jointly and severally, as follows:
I.

Damages of $101,595.00 pursuant to the verdict of the jury, representing the full
amount of property damages awarded to plaintiffs; plus

001950
February 24, 2015 11 :21 AM
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2.

Pre-judgment interest at the post-judgment statutory rate in effect January I, 2015
(2.27% per annum) on $101,595.00 from June 13, 2007, through the date of entry
of the Judgment; plus

3.

Costs of$3,198.17 pursuant to plaintiffs' Verified Memorandum of Costs; less

4.

Recovery of $2,000.00 from former defendant Auto-Owners Insurance Company
pursuant to a prior settlement of claims; plus

5.

Post-judgment interest at the statutory rate from the date of entry of the Judgment
until the Judgment is paid in full.
<<END OF TEXT OF JUDGMENT>>
<<JUDGE'S APPROVAL APPEARS AT TOP OF DOCUMENT>>

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
rs-Joseph P. Barrett
Counsel for Denise Bohne and
Western States Insurance Agency, Inc.
(Electronic signature affixed by filing
attorney with authorization::-::
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Addendum Exhibit 2:
Stipulated Jury Instruction No. 29

•

JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 29

The Fullers seek recovery of prejudgment interest as part of their loss. In Utah,
prejudgment interest may be awarded in situations where the damage is complete, the loss can be
measured by facts and figures, and the amount of loss is fixed as of a particular time. If you find
for the Fullers on their claim of prejudgment interest. you should award them 10% annually on
the value of their proven loss from the date of the fire to the date of your verdict.
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Addendum Exhibit 3:
Final Jury Instruction No. 29

JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 29
Prejudgment Interest

The Fullers seek recovery of prejudgment interest as part of their loss. In Utah,
prejudgment interest may be awarded in situations where the damage is complete, the loss can be
measured by facts and figures, and the amount of loss is fixed as of a particular time. If you find
for the Fullers on their claim of prejudgment interest, you should award them 10% annually on
the value of their proven loss from the date of the fire to the date of your verdict.

•
•
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Addendum Exhibit 4:
Transcript of Stipulation
and Ruling on
Prejudgment Interest
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CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
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For the Plaintiffs:
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Attorney at Law

For the Defendants:

JOSEPH P. BARRETT
Attorney at Law
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DAVID FULL.ER (Rebuttal)
Direct Examination by Mr. Christiansen
No Cross Examination
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JURY INSTRUCTIONS
CLOSING ARGUMENTS
Mr. Christiansen
Mr. Barrett

87, 146
132

VERDICT

161

'

.

MR. BARRETT: In addition, Your Honor, there was a

1
2

mid-trial motion on rent, in addition - you said pretrial in

3

your colloquy.

4

motion-

5

THE COURT: The motion to dismiss.

6

MR. BARRETT: At the close -

7

THE COURT: At the close of the case.

8

MR. BARRETT: Correct.

9

THE COURT: You can finish up with the verdict form

10

afterwards.

11

the jury in.

13

Right.

What I really need are the instructions to bring

MR. BARRETT: They're done.

12

I think they've been

sent-

14

THE COURT: Then let's bring -

15

MR. BARRETT: - they -

16

THE COQRT: - give me the instructions, let's get

17
18
19

(inaudible) MR. BARRETT: They've been sent to you as
stipulated.

It went, so I don't know if you got it.

20

(Inaudible conversation)

21

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Your Honor, may I raise one more

22

thing along the lines of what we've been talking about?

23

THE COURT: Yeah.

24

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: The way we're putting this case

25

•

There was also a trial ruling - a trial

to the jury there really are three broad categories of damage
68

•
1

items.

2

interest, and lost rent.

3

separate lines for each of those, because that's the way that

4

I've presented the case.

5

two, we might as well break out the three.

8

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Yes.

9

(Inaudible conversation}

11

MR. BARRETT: Can I have a moment just to take a
look?

12

(Inaudible conversation}

13

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: No.

14

prejudgment interest on the rent.

15

personal property.

16
17
18

19
20

•

If we're going to break out the

interest needs to be separated?

10

•

And I would propose that we haye

MR. BARRETT: So the question is whether prejudgment

6
7

And they are business property damage, prejudgment

MR. BARRETT: Okay.

I'm not asking for
It's based only on the

Prejudgment interest wouldn't

necessarily be based upon what's (inaudible) property.
(Inaudiole conversation)
1MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Right, and we've instructed on

that, andJI'll argue on that, but -

21

jMR. BARRETT: So I'm not sure the jury decides -

22

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Well, if we tell them there's

23

three - these three different areas of damages, but then.they

24

only have two lines to deal from, it's going to confuse them.

25

I don't want to have to be resorting to saying, collapse
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1

these two -

2

THE COURT: That's fine.

3

MR. BARRETT: I'm not opposed.

4

THE COURT: Yeah, that's fine.

5

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Okay.

6

Very good.

Thank you,

Your Honor.

7

THE COURT: Line them up.

Jen's going to make - we

8

need - how many copies do we need?

Nine, 10, 11 copies when

9

they're done.

10

(Inaudible conversation)

11

THE COURT: Do I have to make any changes to this?

12

MR. BARRETT: We have interlineated (inaudible).22B.

13

{Inaudible conversation)

14

THE COURT: So this is a full and complete set?

15

Yes?

16

MR. BARRETT: It is, Your Honor.

17

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Yes, Your Honor.

18

THE COURT: Can you seal my signature here, and

19

{inaudible).

Might as well image it.

Give me 11 copies.

20

CLERK: Just these ones, right?

21

THE COURT: Yep.

22

(Inaudible conversation from 11:56:38 to 12:02!50)

23

THE COURT: Okay.

24

MR. BARRETT: Your Honor, if we can, we were having

25

Go ahead.

discussion about whether the special verdict form should
70

1

allow, in addition to a damage line for property as well. as a

2

damage line for rent, whether it should also have prejudgment

3

interest.

4

MUJI, Model Utah Jury Instructions, Second Edition, special

5

verdict form CV 1899, and it is in the context of a fraud

6

instruction, which is a variation of the negligent

7

misrepresentation, so I realize it's not particularly

8

analogous, but in this, it indicates that counsel should

9

specify the type of damages, in this case economic and non-

And during the break, I was able to look at the

10

economic.

Our case, there are no non.

And damages so the

11

judge can calculate prejudgment interest.

12

would prefer that that remain the situation here.

13

THE COURT: Let me ask Mr. Christiansen.

Your Honor, I

So, I

14

mean, you're asking for it, but I - my experience has always

15

been the opposite.

16

- I mean, if there's no dispute MR. CHRISTIANSEN: We've got an instruction in on

17
18

Where I'm - if there is a dispute, I'can

it.

19

THE COURT: We can strike the instruction.

20

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Well, but I want the jury to

21

decide whether they're - whether the plaintiffs are entitled

22

to prejudgment interest.

23

make that determination.

24
25

You're not saying the Court would

THE COURT: Well, are you - is there any argument
about whether 71

•

1

MR. BARRETT: No -

2

THE COURT: - they're entitled to prejudgment

3

interest?

4

MR. BARRETT: No, Your Honor.

5

THE COURT: All right.

6

MR. BARRETT: If there's a property damage -

7

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Okay.

8

MR. BARRETT: - there's going to be prejudgment

9

interest -

10

THE COURT: Right, so you're - it - your - they're -

11

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Then I'm okay with that.

12

THE COURT: Right.

13

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: (Inaudible).

14

THE COURT: I didn't - I didn't - it's - we're on

Exactly.

15

the same page.

16

whether they're entitled to it or not.

17

in there, and when we get to it, instruct them to just strike

18

it out, that the Court will - well, just strike that out,

19

that that's no longer a part of the instructions.

20

can tell them that.

21

22

I don't see that there's a disagreement about

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Okay.

What I'll do is, it's

And you

Can we take that

instruction out completely from the jury?

23

THE COURT: Just rip out instruction 29.

24

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Thank you, Your Honor.

25

THE COURT: And I'll tell them that we're skipping
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1

that, that was a potential we skipped over.

2

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Okay.

3

THE COURT: All right, so take it out - look, part

Excellent.

How's that?,
Thank you.

4

of me - it's a simple calculation, so I really didn't care

5

much, because it's a 10 percent calculation and you can do it

6

in your head.

7

it's - the amount is fine.

8

is the better approach.

THE COURT: Yep.

10

12

13
14

But as a technical matter, this

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Thank you, Your Honor.

9

11

I also don't think, as I said, there's any -

Okay, so jury instruction 29 is

withdrawn.
MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Your Honor, at what point are you
going to remove the alternate?
THE COURT: After it's been - I can't remove him

15

until it's been submitted.

He won't deliberate with them.

16

Under the rules, he'll be excused beforehand.

17

that's right.

18

context, so let's just make sure that's that's right.

19

alternate juror who does not replace a principal juror shall

20

be discharged when the jury retires to consider its verdict,

21

unless the parties stipulate otherwise and the Court approves

22

the stipulation.

23

him, and he -

I think that

It's slightly different in the criminal
So, an

I don't see any reason why we would keep

24

(Inaudible conversation)

25

THE COURT: Let him go back to his life as quickly
73

Addendum Exhibit 5:
Withdrawn Jury Instruction
No. 29

•
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 29

•

Prejudgment Interest

The Fullers seek recovery of prejudgment interest as part of their loss. In Utah,
prejudgment interest may be awarded in situations where the damage is complete, the loss can be
measured by facts and figures, and the amount of loss is fixed as of a particular time. If you find
for the Fullers on their claim of prejudgment interest, you should award them I 0% annually on
the value of their proven loss from the date of the fire to the date of your verdict.

•
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Addendum Exhibit 6:
Special Verdict Form
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., fd"i ~·'"=',..;- ~ ~~1cr cou~.
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OCT 3 O 2014
~t.!..T LA!:.: C•)U~TY

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR----------:.:--:-4,.~.;l,,
6eriul!, Clo"
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DAVID AND RUTH M. FULLER AND
FULLER'S APPLIANCE PARTS AND
SERVICE, LLC,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

SPECIAL VERDICT

Civil No. 100901093
DENISE BOHNE AND WESTERN STATES
INSURANCE AGENCY,
Defendants.

l.

Honorable Deno Himonas

Breach of Agency Duties: Have the Fullers proved this claim against Denise

Bohne and/or Western States by a preponderance of the evidence? Yes

)(

No

--

(Ifyou marked "Yes" go to Question l .a. Ifyou marked "No" go to Question 2.)
a. Were the Fullers also at fault? Yes

L_

No - - (Go to l.b.)

b. What are the percentages of fault allocated to each party?

@

2.

Denise Bohne/
Western States

GO%

Ruth Fuller

0

%

David Fuller

0

%

Fullers' Appliance

_!tQ_%

Total

100%

(Go to Question 2.)

Breach of Contract: Have the Fullers proved this claim against Denise Bohne

and/or Western States by a preponderance of the evidence? Yes _ _ No_X_

(Go lo Question 3.)

001733

Promissory Estoppel: Have the Fullers proved this claim against Denise Bohne

3.

and/or Western States by a preponderance of the evidence? Yes _ __ No_x_

(Go to Question 4.)
Negligent Misrepresentation: Have the Fullers proved this claim against Denise

4.

Bohne and/or Western States by a preponderance of the evidence? Yes

X

No _ _

(Ifyou marked "Yes" to any of Questions 1 through 4, please go to Question 5. Otherwise, stop
here and have your foreperson sign and date the form and inform the bailiffyou have reached a
verdict.)

What amount, if any, would fairly compensate the Fullers for any harm caused by

5.

the defendants?

I

I l!lt 6"'15"'"

Property Damages:$_ _ _ _1_ _ _ _ _ __
Rent Damages:

,_Q________

$___

(When six or more ofyou have agreed on the answer to each question that is required to be
answered, your foreperson should sign and date
d advise the bailiffthat you have
reached a verdict.)

Date I

/

Jury For~~_ /) A J

y«cef

JV( -

f) ,
l_jlc,,,

bo(?;...--

2
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Addendum Exhibit 7:

•

•

•

Memorandum Decision,
Dated 1/6/15

•

rab.liiu uila aiti&w a 11,uahh
Third Judicial District

s

In the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of \J,!fb."i: "'"'" , ,
DAVID FULLER, et al,
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiffs,
Case No. 100901093

•

vs .

Hon. Deno G. Himonas
DENISE BOHNE, et al.,
Defendants.
This case was tried to a jury in October 2014. The jury entered a verdict in Plaintiffs•
favor on two of Plaintiffs' claims. Currently before the Court is Plaintiffs• Motion for Entry of
Judgment. In the motion, Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter judgment in the full amount of
damages, plus prejudgment interest. As set forth below, I agree with Plaintiffs that they are
entitled to ajudgment in the full amount awarded by the jury. However, because additional
briefing on the question of prejudgment interest is required, I reserve ruling on that portion of
Plaintiffs' motion until briefing on that issue has been completed.
BACKGROUND

In this action, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants1 Denise Bohne and Western States
Insurance Agency, Inc. (Western States) failed to obtain full insurance for property damage that
Plaintiffs had requested when they obtained a new insurance policy. Plaintiffs also alleged that
Defendants incorrectly stated that the policy issued to Plaintiffs contained the requested
coverage. Based on those allegations, Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit against Defendants,
asserting causes of action for (1) breach of agency duties (the agency claim), (2) breach of
contract, (3) promissory estoppel, and (4) negligent misrepresentation (the misrepresentation
claim).
'
At trial, the parties agreed to a series of jury instructions, including one instruction that
dealt with an award of prejudgment interest. However, the parties agreed to withdraw that
instruction because the amount of prejudgment interest, if any, would be awarded by the Court.
Defendants also requested a special verdict form. The Court granted that request and the parties
stipulated to a special verdict form that was given to the jury. On the form, the jury was asked to
allocate fault on the agency claim. The form did not, however, make any similar allocation
request with respect to the remaining claims.

•

The jury ultimately determined that Plaintiffs proved their agency and misrepresentation
claims but had failed to prove the breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims. The jury
also found that the total amount of damages to compensate Plaintiffs for their loss wo~ld be
1 Plaintiffs' claims against other defendants in this action were resolved prior to trial. Therefore, I refer to Bohne and
Western States collectively as "Defendants" in this Memorandum Decision.
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$~01,595.00. Pursuant to the instructions on the special verdict form, the jury allocated a portion
of the fault to Plaintiffs on the breach of agency duties claim, allocating 60 percent of the fault to
Defendants and 40 percent of the fault to Plaintiffs. The jury was not asked to allocate any fault
on the misrepresentation claim and there is nothing in the form to suggest what fault, if any, the
jury would have allocated to Plaintiffs on that claim.
ANALYSIS

•

· Plaintiffs now ask the Court to enter judgment in their favor in the full amount of
damages awarded, plus prejudgment interest. Defendants contend that the judgment requested by
Plaintiffs is improper for three reasons: (1) there was insufficient evidence to establish one of the
necessary elements of negligent misrepresentation, (2) the jury's allocation of fault to Plaintiffs
on the agency claim should also apply to the misrepresentation claim, and (3) prejudgment
interest is not appropriate in this case. I address each of these argwnents in turn.
L
The Sufficiency oftlie Evidence
. Turning to the first argwnent, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs failed to prove their
misrepresentation claim because Plaintiffs did not show that Defendants had a financial stake in
the transaction at issue, which is a necessary element of a claim for negligent misrepresentation.
See generally Atkinson v. lHC Hospitals,·1nc., 798 P.2d 733, 737 (Utah 1990) ("Negligent
misrepresentation ... occurs when [o]ne who, in the course of his business, profession or
employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false
information for the guidance of others in their business transactions ...." (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Specifically, Defendants claim that because the additional
coverage would have allowed Defendants to receive a greater commission on the sale of the
insurance policy, the failure to provide the requested coverage was actually detrimental to
Defendants' financial interest. Based on the evidence presented at trial, I disagree.

•

At a minimum, there was evidence presented that Defendants had a financial interest in
the transaction beca.~se it resulted in Plaintiffs electing to purchase or renew their policy through
Defendants. While it is true that Defendants' failure to add the additional coverage might have
resulted in slightly reduced commissions compared to a policy that included the coverage, the
fact remains that Defendants did receive a commission for the insurance policy that Plaintiffs
purchased. The commission from that purchase would clearly be greater than receiving no
commission if Plaintiffs had elected to purchase a different insurance policy from somebody
else.2 Therefore, it is apparent that there :was evidence that Defendants had a financial or
pecuniary interest in the transaction involving Plaintiffs, decision to purchase or renew their
insurance policy.
Whether Allocatio11 Should Apply to Bot/1 Claims
Next, Defendants assert that the jury's allocation of fault on the agency claim also applies
to the misrepresen~tion claim, and therefore, Plaintiffs' damages award should be reduced by 40
percent on both the: agency and misrepresentation claims. In support of that argument,
II.

•

Indeed. businesses may often offer promotions involving significant discounts on one item or service in order to
promote purchases of other items or maintain relationships with existing clientele. While the sale of the discounted
item or service may, stll!iding alone, result in a loss to the business, that discount may lead to more profitable sales
on other
items or over the
:
.. long run as the business maintains its relationship with customers.

2

•
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Defendants claim that if the allocation does not apply to both claims, there would be an
inconsistency in the special verdict fonn that would nullify the jury's verdict. Plaintiffs disagree,
arguing that the agency and misrepresentation claims are independent causes of action, each of
which is subject to a separate allocation. Therefore, Plaintiffs maintain, the verdicts are
reconcilable.because it would be reasonable for the jury to allocate fault to Plaintiffs on one
claim and not the other.
As a preliminary matter, I am not convinced that there is any need to reconcile the
verdicts because the jury simply did what it was instructed to do when it allocated fault on one
claim but not the other. The special verdict fonn only asked the jury to allocate fault on the
agency claim, and the jury did so. Defendants did not request any allocation of fault on the
misrepresentation ciaim and the special verdict fonn did not include any instruction or option to
allocate fault among the parties on that claim. Thus, when the jury did not allocate fault on the
misrepresentation claim, the jury was simply following the instructions on the special verdict
form. If fault was supposed to be allocated on the misrepresentation claim, Defendants should
have sought to submit that request to the jury in the first instance, rather than attempting to infer
that the jury intended ·such an allocation after the jury rendered its verdict.
Nevertheless, even assuming that there is some conflict between the jury's allocation of
fault to Plaintiffs on one claim but not'the other, I agree with Plaintiffs that there is a reasonable
basis for the jury's verdict. Where there is a possible inconsistency in a special verdict, courts do
"not preswne incorisistency,'' but instead "seek to reconcile the answers if possible. When
reviewing claims that a jury verdict is inconsistent, [courts] must accept any reasonable view of
the case·that makes'.thejury's answers consistent. Accordingly, ajury's verdict will be sustained,
everi in the face of P,ossible inconsistency, if the judgment can be read harmoniously." Tooele
Associates Ltd P's~ip v. Tooele City, 2012 UT App 214,110,284 P.3d 709, 713 cert. denied
sub nom. Tooele Assoc. v. Tooele City, 293 P.3d 376 (Utah 2012) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). Stated another way, if a court is "[g]iven the choice of two competing
reasonable alternatives, [the court is] bound to adopt the construction of the verdict that does not
nullify the jury's answers." Id. (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Defendants claim that the allocation of fault on the agency claim but not the
misrepresentation claim would result in an inconsistent verdict because the same allocation of
fault would apply to both claims. However, as explained above, inferring an intent to al_locate
fault on both claims would effectively nullify what the jury actually decided; namely, to allocate
fault to Plaintiffs only on the agency claim. Moreover, while it is possible that the jury intended
to apply the same allocation of fault to both claims, there is nothing in the record to indicate that
the jury intended to ·allocate fault on both claims, nor is there anything to indicate what
percentage of fault would be allocated to Plaintiffs on the misrepresentation claim. Thus, any
conclusion regarding the jury's intent regarding those questions would be based almost entirely
on speculation.
·
. Furthermore, as Plaintiffs state, the most reasonable way to resolve any inconsistency in

the jury's verdict arid give effect to all of the jury's answers on the special verdict form is to

ass~e that because the two claims involve distinct legal theories, a different allocation of fault
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applies to the misrepresentation and agency claims. Such a conclusion is supported by the facts
of this case and the different theories presented in the instructions given to the jury.
As set forth in the jury instructions, the jury could only find for Plaintiffs on the negligent
misrepresentation claim if Defendants made a false statement to Plaintiffs that Defendants should
have known was not true and Plaintiffs reasonably relied on Defendants' statement. With respect
to the agency claim, Plaintiffs could prevail under several theories, including that Defendants
failed to follow Plaintiffs' instructions, that Defendants failed to provide important information,
or that Defendants failed to exercise reasonable care in performing their duties. 3 Based on the
evidence presented in this case and these different theories, it is reasonable to assume that the
jury had separate factual bases for its findings on the two claims that would warrant allocation of
fault to Plaintiffs solely on the agency claim.
For example, the jury could have found that Defendants did not exercise reasonable care
or failed to follow Plaintiffs' instructions in ·obtaining the requested coverage. Under such a
theqry, the jury may have concluded that Plaintiffs bore some of the fault for the loss because
Plaintiffs had a duty to investigate any remaining questions and verify that the requested
coverage was in effect. In contrast, the jury may have declined to allocate fault to Plaintiffs on
the misrepresentation claim because -Plaintiffs reasonably relied on an affirmative-albeit falsestatement by Defendants. Inasmuch as the reasonableness of Plaintiffs' reliance on Defendants'
statement would already be established, it would logically follow that Plaintiffs had no duty to
further investigate the veracity of Defendants' statement regarding the requested coverage. In
that case, it would be entirely reasonable for the jury to conclude that fault should not be
allocated to Plaintiffs on the misrepresentation claim.
Given these different theories for the two claims and the evidence presented at trial, it is
clear that there was· a reasonable basis for the jury to make different allocations of fault on the
two claims. Because that is the only way to reconcile any inconsistencies in the verdict without
nullifying at least one of the jury's answers on the special verdict form, I must presume that the
jury did not intend to allocate fault to Plaintiffs on the misrepresentation claim. Therefore,
Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment of in the full amount of damages, which is $101,595.00.
Ill
Prejudgment Interest
_Turning finally to the question of prejudgment interest, Defendants contend that an award
of prejudgment interest would be improper because the Court has not made the determinations
necessary for an award of prejudgment interest 4 In response, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants
stipulated to an award of prejudgment interest when the parties agreed to withdraw the
prejudgment interest instruction from the jury instructions.
3 Nothing on the special verdict form required the jury to identify which of these theories served as the basis for the
jwy's verdict on the agency claim.

4 In their memorandum ·opposing Plaintiffs' motion, Defendants seemingly argued that prejudgment interest might
be inappropriate because the prejudgment interest statute, see Utah Code Ann. § 15-l-l, only applies to contractual
claims and Plaintiffs' p(operty damage claims were based on theories of negligence. However, at oral argument,
Defendants acknowledg!!d that prejudgment interest may be awarded in negligence actions to recover for damages to
property. See generally Vali Convalescent & Care Institutions v. Div. ofHealth Care Fin., 797 P.2d 438, 44S (Utah
Ct App. 1990) (stating t_hat a right to prejudgment interest exists independent of the prejudgment interest statute).
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From the record before me, it appears that Defendants did not stipulate to an absolute
award of any prejudgment interest that Plaintiffs requested. Rather, in withdrawing the jury
instruction on that issue, the parties agreed that the Court should make the final determination
regarding prejudgment interest after the conclusion of the trial and add that amount to the final
judgment.
In order to determine whether prejudgment interest applies, and if so, what the amount of
interest is, I must make several subsidiary detenninations, including whether the damage is
complete, whether the damages can be measured using facts and figures, and whether the amount
of loss can be fixed as of a particular time. While some of those determinations may be made
based on the jury's verdict, Defendants correctly point out that some of those determinations
have yet to be made. Given the parties' agreement that the Court should make the final
determination of prejudgment interest,. I believe that further briefing on the prejudgment issue
would be appropriate. Consequently, I reserve ruling on that issue and Plaintiffs' motion until
briefing is completed.
In accordance with the foregoing, the parties should submit their supplemental briefs on
the.prejudgment interest issue within five (5) business days of the date of this ruling. I will hear
·
st
argument on that i~sue at 2:00 p.m. on the 21 of January.
DATED this £&ay of January, 2015
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
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1

I'm going to stick with the June date.
Mr. Barrett, again, I think that the correct

2
3

analysis - economic analysis would be, when is the date of

4

that check to be received?

s

date of that check, when that check would be deposited, and

6

interest would be able to accrue on that amount.

7

why I believe that it's - the June date is the one that most

8

closely approximates it.

9

rate is - well, strike that.

I

•

10

rate.

11

additional decisions.

12
13

And that is

In addition, I think that the lower
I'm going to wait on the l9wer

I want to go back and take a look at a couple of .
So, let's say 2:30, conference call?

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Do you want us to call you, or
should we THE COURT: Jen will organize it, but we'll chat at

14
15

What is the best estimate of the

2:30.

16

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Very good.

17

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

18

MR. BARRETT: Thank you, Your Honor.

19

(Whereupon a recess was taken from 9:28:23 to

20

2:17:28 regarding this case)

21

THE COURT: Hello?

22

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

23

MR. BARRETT: Hi, Judge.

24

THE COURT: All right, this is - it's the Fuller

25

matter, I have Mr. Barrett and Mr. Christiansen?
19

1

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Yes.

2

MR. BARRETT: Yes.

3

THE COURT: Okay.

I have spent some more time

4

considering the question of the appropriate rate in this·

5

matter, and re-reviewed some of the authorities.

6

convinced that the post judgment rate is appropriate, not the

7

10 percent rate in this matter.
I think it was 2.16 percent, Mr. Barrett?

8

9

I am

What was

it?

10

MR. BARRETT: 2.13, Judge.

11

THE COURT: 2.13.

So, that leaves the question, I

12

think, of costs.

Mr. Christiansen, what were the cost - are

13

there - is there any objection to the amount of the costs,

14

Mr. Barrett?

15

MR. BARRETT: (Inaudible) -

16

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Your Honor - before we leave;the

17

post judgment interest rate, can we just hone in on that for

18

a minute?

19

place right now is 2.27 percent.

20

website, and it's tied to federal rate.

21

have happened in the 2.13 percent is, there's a rate that's

22

published a few days into January that's the 2.13, but the

23

rule is that you apply what was in place January 1, and that

24

carries over from something that was in late December -

25

The actual post judgment interest rate that's in
That's what's on the court
I think what might

THE COURT: I - Mr. Barrett?
20

1

I think that I

2

looked at the rate when I prepared the b~ief, so that may be

3

true.

4

THE COURT: So, the -

5

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: I'm sure -

6

THE COURT: Let's put it this way, then.

7

whatever the current post judgment interest rate is will be

8

the - will operate as the prejudgment rate, and I appreciate

9

that clarification, Mr. Christiansen.

The -

So, now, with res -

10

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: As of today.

11

THE COURT: As of today.

12

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: (Inaudible) I remember, it's. a

13

•

MR. BARRETT: Yes - yes, Your Honor.

federal reserve rate plus two percent.

14

THE COURT: Yeah, I - you know, it's -

15

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

16

THE COURT: - I mean, we're talking about some minor

(Inaudible) talking about.

17

decimal points here, but nevertheless, let's make - it is a

18

known commodity, let's use the known commodity.

19
20

21

Costs.

Are there - is there any objection to the

request of costs?
MR. BARRETT: I don't believe so, Your Honor.

I

22

didn't file an objection to the costs.

I assume (inaudible)

23

correctly, that they weren't significant, and they're subject

24

to the offset of the settlement with the other party, if I

25

remember, Steve, is that correct?
21
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I ;'I'(' l•m l•~ST.

TITLE 38.
IN'rEREST.
1241. Legal rate of interest. 'l'he legnl rate of jnt,erest upouJhe lon11 1,r
forbearance o:f nuy money, goods, or things fo action shnU be eight 1>c1· cent
per annum. But nothing herein contained shall be so construed ns to in. 111tv
way affect any contract or obligation made before the taking effecit of thfl;
title.

Am 'd '07, p. 43.

.T111!gnw11tto include interest, § 3353,
TJw usun• lnw of 1007 wn11 tnkc11 ulmost ,·er•
bnlim from thcst11tt1t1-t1 of New York,
Uaurious bond nnd mortgage enforced, In n
i;tute whore tliNc• is n stntuto milking usury penul
but not dec)nring tho contruct \'aid, 1i usurious
bond nntl mnrlgngo muy bo c11forcml for tho
umount m,tunlh· duo.
Bcnilici11cl v.'Finnun, SOU. S. 170; not roportc<l
in Utnh reports.
.
Interest to maturity of note.. An ngrecmcnt to
pny int N·cst on n note which pro,•idt•s for "iult•resi
11t tho rnti, of two per cent pnr month from clnt<-,"
doc:i not ext1•11d boy!Jnd the t.imc snit.I nolc becomes

duo nnd p11r11ble by its terms.

Perry v: J'n~·lor, 1 U. 03.
An account stated cnrries Interest from tluJ clnv
ofi Il! liq uidnlion.
•
OO(IIJ1, , •. Young, .1 U. M; nffirmed 82 U.S. /'j02,
Interest on judgment ls statutory. Without
tlw n11tl111rit ,. nf II Mtntut<- it, is error for I\ ju,Jgn,,,ut
lo rlir,•cr thnt llw jmlJ.(nwnt. hmr inkrcst.
lle,-re , .. Knott, 3 U. •l;,l; :!•IP. i57.
Rule ol pnrtlul payments. The rule, for r.ompullng i11lcr1•tit wh~n tlwn, hu,·u b1•1,n pnrtinl p11yllll't1ls is to 11pph· thc p1wm1•11t to the 1lischnrgc ·or
tlui i11l1•rt•Ht clur., 11ml if'the payment cxc1•c1ls tho
inlcrt.,;t., t.hi, HUrph1111?nt'>1 lownrd llilll'hnri.,-ing the
principnl; lf the Jl!1Ymmt bole&< th1111 thc intnrcst,
the ~11rpl11g of llm mti,rc,sL <111c must not be taken to
nugnJC111t tho principnl, l)llt intnest eontimws 011
Uw formnr principal until the 1wriml wlu•n the pnymont6 trtk1•11 101-:1,thcr r•xcced tho intcn•Ht d111•, mid
then the ~urph1H i11 t-0 be nppli"<I townrtl dischnrging tho princ1pnl.
l'!!rry v. Taylor, l l.;, 08.
Compound Interest, In n tl1•crco of (oreclo~uro
of t.rm•t dcml, compound intr.rcdl, is uot 111low11hlc,

11ml tho dccrr.c $houldnllow interest only 011 tii~
princip11l 11t tho stipulntcd rii.to of IS per 1,cut.
" Sle~ens Imp. Co. v'. South Ogden L. B. & 1. c ... ,
-0 U. -07; 58 P. 843,

Wlinro t.he ovhlctico in tho roooril is not suflici.•nt.
lo justify Ulll uomputulion of lnw.rest upon 1111 ·it•
count eurrcut, by monthly rest.A, it is crror to ull, '"
euch.,:;omputntion.
,Jones,•. Onllighcr, OU. 120; 33 P. 417.

INTEREST AS DAMAGES:
If 11 debt ought to be pnid nt n p11rtictilnr 1irn,•
nnd is not, owing to the clofnult of'tho debtor, tho
creditor is entitled to intcroat. from thnt timl', by
wuy or compc11Y11Licm for tho dnluy in puy:Uicnt,

Young,•. Godbc, 82 U.S. 502.
Where n purch118<,r nlieci:1 to t1ny into court thie
purchnRo prwo or 11 mino couocrnmg which t.11'-' ,.,.,,.
dor hnH litignlion, tho former .wiHbo li11bl•! for wtnrl!St <lurlnp: the time ho withholds t.ht• mmw,·.
Wu~utr:ldllining Co. Y, Creimcnt ?!lining Co:, i r.
8; 24 P. /i8ll;1111irmod llH. U.S. 817.
Wlwrc int<'rt•st is rnco\·crnbh, ns tl1\mngca fnr ,i,,_
lr_1r in pnynwnL, it is n mnttlir lnrgt'ly in iho cli,cro~
tum ol Uw c1111rl•.
·
Culmer\', Cuinc, 22 U. 210; 01 P. 1008.
In tort for unliquidnto)d tlmnng<'.il, 1,lninllfT !,,•i,I
err titled to interr.iit frorn timo or bringing uciiou
Woorllnnd v. U. l'. llN,;27U. 643; 201'. :?US; d1·
ciclctl 1801 but not re1mi-tocl.
In tort for u11liqui,l11tc<l.<lnmogcs, interest. 1,11 , i..1lumngt'H 11sscsscd froui,lho dnt.r. of.the comn11,111,imc?nt of the ncUonup to the date of tho \·crdi,·t is

not, rccrn·crnhfo.
Lester y. 1ligh111ml Bo,· G, l[. Co., 27 U . .170; ;a
l'. 3-U.
. •
Nichols v. U. P.R. R. Co,, 7 u;·510; 27 I'. m1:i.

1241x. Maximum rate. Exceptions. 'l'lrn parties to nr1y contract rnay
ng1·cc i11 writing for the pnymcnt of interest, for the loan or forbearance of nuy
money, goods, or thfogs in uct;ion, not to cxccccl twelve per cent.. per n111111111;
pro,lidcd, that 011 lonns of money only to the amount of $100 or less, it 11111~· he
ng1·eed in writing to take or receive ns interest 011 suicl lon.u not. to exce<~tl -~1
for the ffri;t mouth only of snid Joun, hnt thcrcnft.cr no g1·c11tcr intcrcs1 shall
he l'.Oi1tl'nctcd for, taken or received thnn is allowed in this section. Thi:;
1m1viso sh nil not he construed so as to nllow or permit the spHtting up nf
trnnsnctions for the Joun of money into small amounts fo1• the pi1rpust• oi
evnding the provjsions of this title.
'07,°1). 43. ·
.
l'rior to ndoption of U l:?41~l:?41xll, an 11gr<'cmrnl for nil)" rnto or inton.•st wns luwrul iu Utnh.
124lxl. Id. No pcr1mu, nHSOl\intion, or corpol'ution shnll directly 01· inclirec.tly tnlrn or l'Nmivti in 111011cy, goocls, or thi11g11 in nctiou, or in nu;v olhl'I'
wny, 1111y greater snm ur grmttcr vnlue rl}r the lonu 01~ ft)J•hen1·nncc ui' ll!IY
mouey, g0Ulh1, or things in nr.lion. tl11111 is presc1%ctl in § 1241x. · 107. p. 1:t
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3316. Continuation of benelita. In the event of the termination of
membership in the society by the person responsible for the support of any
child,· on whose account a certificate may have been issued, as provided
herein, the certificate may be continued for the benefit of the estate of the
child, provided the contributions are continued, or for the benefit of any
other person responsible for the support and maintenance of such child,
who shall assume the payment of the required contributions.

,,

TITLE 53.
INTEREST.

•··'".
..
~

~ ~

l

INTEREST.

'

3320. (1241.) Legal rate of interest. The legal rate of interest upon
the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or things in action shall be
eight per cent per nnnum. But nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to in any way affect any contract or obligation made before th~
taking effect of this title.
Am'd '07, p. 43.

Judgment to Include Interest, I 7050.
Tho usury law oC 1907 waa ·taken altnoat vcr•
bnthn Crom the statutell or New York.
Interest on einall loans, t 4384.
Public tunda to draw Interest, I 4600.
In a. stato where there la a statute making
usury penal but not decla.Tlng the contract
void, o. usurious bond 11nd morti;age may be
entorced tor the amount actually due,
flernhelacl v. Pirman, 89 U. S. 170; not re•
pnrtecl In Utah reports.
An 11groement tn pay lntereHt 011 n note
which provllles tor "Interest 1u the rnte o( two
1,er cent pur month rrom dn.te," 1loes not ex•
tend beyond tho Umo anld note beromee dul!
ancl pnynblo by Ila terms.
Perry , •• 'l'aylor, 1 u. 63.
An account etnted ,·a.1Tles lnlereat from the
,111:v uf lls llquldutlon.
Oodbo v. Young, 1 U. 55; nfflrmcd 82 U. S.

i,

r.r.2.

1 ·.

Without tho 11.uthorlty oC a atntute It Is
error for a Judgment to •llre<'l that the Ju•lgmi,nt bear Interest,
H<>ec•e v. Knott, 3 U, ~r.l: 24 P, 767.
1'hc rule for com11utlng Interest when there
hn\·e ooen pnrllnl pnyment11 Ill li> llflJIIY tho
11ny111enl In the discharge of the Interest due,
and Ir tho payment excced11 the lntere11t, the
sor11111s goes toward discharging the p1·lnt•I·
1~11: tr the payment ho leo11 lhnn the lntere11t,
the sur111us or the Interest due must not he
t11ke11 to augment the prlnclp11I, but lnlel"t'st
rr111lln11011 on tho former principal untll the
pc-rlocl when tho p1lYmente token together ox•
reecl the Interest due, and lhen the sur11h111
111 lo be upplled toward 11lschn1·glng the prlnch»ll,
Porry v. Tnylor, I U. 63.
In n cler.ree or rorec,lnsure or trual deed. com111111ml Interest I• not nllnwnble, and the rlerr<"e
should nllow Interest only 011 tho prlncl11al at
the ullpulatecl rnte oC 18 per cent.
Ktt>Vc>ns Jn,p, Co, v, Sbuth Ogtlen L. n. & 1,
C'o., 20 u. za7; r.s p, 8(3,
'vi,ere tl1e ev II• cnt'e In ti 1e recnn11II nn l su r•
Oi,lenl to Justify tho computation or lnlPrcal
1111nn nn account current, by monthly roula,
II le error tn allow such comp11t11llnn.
Jones v, G11Jllghcr. 11 U, 126: 33 P, (17,
Wh.ere a: note provhle• ror lntcre11t In reg•
nlnr lnRtn\monls ·nncl 'the mnker cle(nullcd, hn
Is lh1hlo for Interest on· tho 1111ma In dcfnoll nt
lhe rnte nt 8 J1P.r c,onl.
Jcnern v, 1,lchtenstctn, ts U, 320: H6 f'. 1036,
RP.cove!')' f11r mnnoy l11nno1l denl•1I HR uncon•
nt•lnnnl,lo, where I hero: Ima been rc11nhl n Rmn

'-·

.

amounting lo prlnt'lpal and J& per cent per
annum Interest.
carter v. Weal, 38 U, 381: 113 P. Hl26.
F:ngert v, Chadwick, 40 o; 239; 120 P. 323.
In an artlon ngalnst R city, rnr extmR under
a eontr1111t, Interest should ho 11llowed a.t least
rrom lhl\ time tbi- rlnlnt was presenlc<f,
Wilson v, S". L. City, 61 u. -: 173 P. -.
If

INTEREST AS DAMAGES:
a. debt ought to be llahl at a pnrllcu ln.r

tlmo 11ml Is not, owing to tho cletnult or tho
11l•htor, the creditor Is entltle,1 tn lntere11t frnn1
that time, by way or compensation Cur the lie•
lay In pnyment.
Young v. 0odhe, R2 U. R. 662.
Where a puri:huser 11gree11 to pay Into court
the purehnso prlco or a mine concerning which
the vendor has lltl,mllon, the former will ha
llnblo tor Interest clurlng the llmd 110 with•
hnlrla the money.
,v,umkh Mining Co. v. Crescent l\llnlng Co.,
7 11. 8: 2◄ P. r.ss: ufflrmo1l 161 U. S. 317.
Where lntere•t la recnvernble na dnmng<'B fnr
delay In pnyment, It Is 11 matter lurgoly In the
discretion nr tho court.
(")ulmer v. C11lnP, 22 tr. 216; GI P. 1008,
In tori fnr unllquldahul dnmngl'II, rlnlnl IIT
held entltlt>d to Interest rrom tlmn o hrl11gIng a.etlon,
Wondlnnc\ v, U. P. R)',, 27 l.l, G43: 26 l',
2,s: decl•lecl 1891 hut· 1ull re11orted.
In tort fnr unllqultlalec\ cl1•m11ge11, Interest on
the dnmng!'B a11Aeallt'd rrom the 1lnt11 or tl1P
ronnnenrcmt>nl or the nctlon 1111 tu the dntc or
tho vercll,·t le not rccnverahle.
T,eRter v. lllghbuul Roy o. Al. Co., 27 u. ◄ 70:
76 P. 341.

Nichole v, U. P, R.

n,

Co., TU. 610; 21 I',

6 93,

l111ma,ce11 for Injury to n shipment while
In tran111t l11 the nmount or loaa, with lnli-rPRI,
from the thnP ot rlellnr>·: the fMt thnt Iha
1lamngo11 nro nnllr111l<lntecl not being by IIRol(
reuon ror nnt allowlng Interest.
Fel v. u. P. Ry. Co., 32 u. 1n1: 8R P. 1003.
Interest on cllllnai:-es rnr 11111,1 cnmlemnr.rl
1thouhl he. computer! from lhl'I time the coniPIIIIY ta.kea POBBl!llslon.
s. P., L. A •. & R. r,. n. Co. v. n,1. or 1,:,hwnlion, 32 U, 101; 99 P. 263.
Where lntercRl 111 a lt'gi1I r.nna.,.r1ucmt•e or iL
1lPmRn<l wlthn11t 11lh>uhlllnn IL ma,y ho re•
cnvered, thnugh not claimed In the pleu,llngR,
nn,t lnlcrll~t Is allnw<1rl ·In n tort, ·where per•
11onnl propcrty IR delitrn)'ed, rrnm tho •dc•lo nC
the de11tr11cllon
Wheatley v. O. S. T,., .~9 P, JOG; IR.Z. P, 86.

3321. (124lx.) Maximum rate. Exceptions.. The parties to any contract may agree in writing for the payment of interest, for the loan or forbearance o( any money, goods, or things in action, not to exceccl twelve per cent
per annum; ~ro,dcll'd, that on loans of money only to the amount of $100 or
less it may he agreed in writing to take or receive as interest on said foan not
to exceed $1 for the first month only of _saicl loan, but thereafter no greater
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TITLE 44
INTEREST

•

"'1--11-1. l,cgnl Ruic.
The lcg:ll rnte or int1m:st for the loan or forhcaram:e of :iny money, goods or things in action
11hnll be eight per 1:1.mt pur annum. But nothing
herein contained 11hall be so construed as to in
any wuy affect any contract or obligation made
before the Hth d:iy of May, 1907.
(C. L. 17, § 3320.)

•
•

4'1-0-2, Maximum nutes.
The 1mrtics to uny contract muy agree in writing for the payment of interest for the loan or
forbe:u-:rnce of any money, goods or things in action, not to exceed, except us otherwi11e provided
by law, twelve per cent per annum; provided,
lhat on luam, of money only, to the amount of
$100 or le1111, it may be agreed in writing to take
01· rucch·c as interest on 11uch Joun not to exceed
$1 for the first month only of such loan, but
thereafter no greater interest shall be contracted
for, tuken or receiycd than is allowed in this section. This proviso shall not be construed to allow
or permit the splitting up of transactions for the
loan of money into small amounts for the purpoi-ic of e,•ading the pro,•isions of this title.
(C. L. 17, § 3:121.)
l!ult, ur iutcrt••L 11llt1w.sl: On Small Lnnnd, i•ll•li; 'J'c, Jmlu..Lrlnl
l.unn Cut•1,ors\tinnR. ; ..n.3: i•u 1•11wnbrokcrs. 10-0.2.
l!!t.~. 1u.-r unnum nnd 1'.~· 1,,.., month. Uu: 1mn1t.•a
Julmsun, 1:1~ /', 5110, 43 U. I, 20 A. I.. It. 1100,

Uruwu ,••

H-0-:1.

Culculuted b,· lhe Yeu.
Whcne,·er in any statute or deed, or written
or verbal contract, or in any public or lU'il'ule
in11t.rument whatever, any certain rate of interest
is mentioned and no period of time is stated, interest shall be calculated ut the rate mentioned
by the year.
(C. L. 17, § 3326.)

•

Interest un Judgments.
Any judgment rendered on u lawful contrnct
shall conform thereto und shall bear the interest
agreed upon by the 1mrties, which shall be specified in the judgment; other judgmenti-i shall hear
interest at the rate of eight per cent per annum.
,t.l-0-•l.

(C. L. 17, § 3:3:30.)
I nl<•r.·•t to lk• inclmlt~I 111 Jud1m11mt enter,..!, IIM--14,16,
'l'hiK trl•elion hnH no lll•t•lknliun l'Xt'l'l>t. hl J't•r.imnul jud1mu•t1lK.
Sidney Sl4!\"en!l ln11,.. t~u. ,,. Sn. Oud.-n L. U. & Jn111. Cc,.,
t.li J'. 8t:I, :?O U. :?Gi.

H-U-5.

Usury-'rnking Excessh-·e Interest a
l\llsdemennor.
No person 11hall, directly or indirectly, take or
recei\'e in services, money or other property, 11ny
greater sum or grenter rnlue for the 101111 or for-

•
•

hcurance of any money, goods or things in action
than is prescribed in section 44-0-2. Any person
violating any of the proYisions of this section
is guilty of a miHdemeanor.
(C. L. 17, § :1a22.)

•14-0-6. Id. Contracts Void.
All bonds, bills, notes, assurances, conveyances, stocks, pledges, mortgages and deeds of
trust, and all other contracts and securities what11oever, and all deposits of goods or other things
whatsoeYer, whereon 01· whereby there shall be
reserved or taken or secm·ed, or agreed to be re11er\'ed m· taken or secured, any greater sum or
grenter value for a loan or forbearance of any
money, goods or things in action than is above
prescribed shall be void.
(C. L. 17, § 3824,)
Id. Rcco,·ery oC Payments-Limitation of Action.
Every person, or in the event of his death his
personal representati\'es, who shall pay or delh·er any greater sum or value than is allowed by
this title to be received for or on any loan or forbearance, or who shall pay the principal or any
part thereof of a usurious loan or forbearance,
may reco\·er from the person who shall have
taken or received the same the amount of money
so paid or value delivered, both of principal and
interest, provided action is brought within one
year after such payment or delivery. If such action is not brought within said one year a11d
prosecuted with diligence, then the superintendent of public instruction may sue for and recover such sums, with costs, at any time within
three years after said one ;1,·car, for the use and
benefit of the state district school fund, and the
sum so collected shall be forthwith paid into said
fund.
(C. L. 17, § 3323.)
•14-0-7.

Althousrh this 11ectlon srlv"• Lhe riJ:ht uf r,,eu,•cry to Lhe borr1tw•r or his JH.•l'!lonnl re1ir,.,.entnUves, In \'lew of 102-1 J.11 n nurvlvlni: 11nrt11er m11y mnlnl11ln the netlon. Cobb v. HnrttmaLc,in,
11,2 I', 424, •Ii U. JH.

Id. Repayment of Comiideralion Not
11 Condillon Pl'eccclent.
Whenever any borrower of money, goods or
thing!! in 11ction shall file a compl:iint for the
recovery of the moner, goods or things in action
taken 01· l'l'Cei\'ed in violution of this title, it shall
nol be IWCl!SSlll'Y for him to pay
offer to puy
1111)' interest whatever on the sum 111· thing
louncd; nor shall nny court t·equir<l or compel
the parmcnt or deposit of the principal sum or
thing, or nny part thereof, 11.s a condition to the
granting of relief to the b01·1·owe1· In any cnse
or a usurious loan.
(C. L. 17, § 3325.)

•M-0-8.

or
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TITLE 44

INTEREST•
U-0•1.
H-0-t.
H-0-.'L
H-D I.
0

H-0-a.
~~-n-'1.
O-U-1.

l.osr•I Rak.

lla.xit1111n> ka\N..

::;;:,~bI..:t:..!~f!·

Tokin,r >;..,...;ve
Jntt-l'\"11. • Misck1Maanr.
1,1. Co1nrart1 Vold,
hi. llocon.,. of l'afmtnl> IJmlt&tiOII of Atlwn.
l.:•urF -

•tio:ir.t:c!:ft~,!:!.:
... t.
Id.
l!ntr•inl1111 Artloa on
Uaarlauo Contracl - Relurn of S«urlll•._
Id, D1,rounlio11 ISt,c<11laLlo
Par,er.

44-0-1. l.qal Rate.
The leiral rate of lntercat for the loan or !orbearance o! any money,
lfOO(l.ol or thlnsr• in action shall lie elx pu cent per annum. But nothlnir

herein contained ~hall be "° coruotrucd 1111 to In an,- way 111ftd any
pen11lly or lnlcrut charire which by law 11pplia to delinquent or other
or to any cuntrocl or olili?llona made before the 14th clay of May,
1!107.
(C. L. 17, I 3320.)
taiutll

1953
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TITLE 15

•

CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL

.

Chapter 1. Interest, 15-1-1, 15-1-3, 15-1-4 [15-1-2, 15-l-2a, 15-1-5 to 15-1-10
Repealed).
2. Legal Capacity of Children, 15-2-1 to 15-2-5.
3. Interparty Agreements, 15-3-1 to 15-3-4.
4. Joint Obligations, 15-4-1 to 15-4-7.
5. Revolving Charge Agreements [15-5-1 to 15-5-8 Repealed] .

CHAPTER 1
IN'rEREST

•

Section 15-1-1.
15-1-2.
15-l-2a.
15-1-8.
15-1-4.
15-1-5 to

Legal rate.
Repealed.
Ropealod.
Oalculated by tho year.
Interest on judgments.
15·1-10. Repealed •

15-1-1. Legal rate.-The legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or things in action shall be six per cent per
annum. But nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to in any way
affect any penalty or interest charge which by law applies to delinquent
or other taxes or to any contract or obligations made before the 14th day
of May, 1907.
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § l; c; L. 1907, 63. The Act of 1809 bccnme Comp. Laws
§ 1211; a. L. 1911, § 3320; :&. s. rnss, 44.. 1876, § 380, and its provisions remained
0-1; L. 1936, ch. 42, § 1; 0. 1948, 44-0-1.

•

Compiler's Notes.
Tho 1936 amendment reduced the interest rate from 8% to 6,o/o, inserted "any
penalty or interest charge which by law
applioe to dolinquent or other taxes or to,"
and substituted "obligations" for "obligation."
Prior to F ebruary 14, 1868, there wae no
torritorial statute. on the subj ect of interest in Utah. Godbe v. Young, 1 U. 55,
reversed on another point in 15 Wall. (82
U. S.) 562-, 21 L . Ed. 250. At that time it
was enacted, "That it shall not bo lawful
to take more than 10 per cent interest por
annum, when tho am ount of interest has
not boon specified or agreed npon.'' (Lawe
1868, ch. 13, p. 15.) But on February 19,
1869, thjs act was repealed and the following enacted: "'l'hnt it shall be lawful to
take ten por cont interest por annum,
when tho amount of interest has not
been specified or agreed upon." (Laws
1869, ch. 19, p. 17.) Perry v. Taylor, l U.

unchanged. (Godbe v. Young, 1 U . 55, re versed on another point in 15 Wall. (82
U. 8.) 562, 21 L. Ed. 250) until it was
repealed because of its neg11ti ve character. Perry v. Taylor, 1 U. 63.
Thus it v,,il] be seen that former rato
was 10% per annum. Openshaw v. Utah
& N. Ry. Co. , 6 U. 268, 21 P. 999.
Subsequently tho legal rate was changed
to 8% in the absence of agreement, R. S.
1898, § 1241. T.his section was repealed by
Laws 1907, ch. 46, § H, § 1 of which established the rate also at 8%, This was
left unchanged by Comp. Laws 1907,
§ 1241.
Effective Date.
Section 2 of Laws 1935, ch. 42 provided
tl,at said act should tako effect June 15,
1935.
Oross-Reforenccs.
Finance charges for loans other than
consumer or consumer related, 70B-3-605.
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TITLE 15
CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GENE~AL
Chapter
Interest. ·
Legai capacity -of children.
Interparty agreements.
:i5~4. Joint obligations.
15-1.
15-2.
15-3.

CHAPTER 1
.. •• :, ,

.

INTEREST

•

Section
15-1-1.· Legar'rate,
.
15-i-4. · Interest on judgments.

·· l~-1-1. Legal rate. The legal rate of interest'for the loan or forbearance .'
money, g9ods cir"things in action shall be ~ f)el' eent 10% per annum. But
herein .conta'ihed sh·all _be so cons~i-ued as to i1.1 any way affect a·ny penalty or
est cha_rge which by ,law applies ·to delinquent . o.r-.,other taxes or to any co
or obligations made before the 14th day of May, 19M 1981.

•

History: L. 1907, ch. 46, §.I; C.L. 1907,
§ 1241; C.L. 1917, § 3320; R.S. 1933, 44-0-1; L.

1935, ch. 42, § 1; C. 1943, 44-0°1; L.
73, § 1.

15-la4: Interest on judg_nients. Any judgment rendered on a lawful c
shall conform thereto and,.shall pear the interest agreed upon .by the parti
shall be spej!ified' ~n the judgment;, other judgments. shall bear -interest at t
of eigM per~ 12% per annum .
. History: L. 1907, .ch. ~6, § 11; C,L. 1907,
§ 1241X9; C.L. 1917, §3330; R.S. 1933 & C.

1943, 44-0-4; L. 1981, ch. 73, § 2.
Late payment of property division in•·
divorce ·action.

than eight percent for late payment o
ordered paid in a property division
divorce action where the property (
a"'!ard is re11sonable and equi~a~\e._PB
Pope (i978)"589 P 2d 752. · ' · ' · '.v

:~

This section does not prohibit a dist~ict
co~_rt from imposing
interest rate of more

·an

•

CHAPTER 2

·.; :,"

LEGAL CAPACITY OF CHILDREN
Section
15-2-1. Period of minority.

•

262

14

1985
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)NTRACTORS' BONDS

1pted to
1t of an
ays was
Ir period
)scar E.
Electric,

red bond
·esult in
defau lt;
actor all
·s signed
ceipt of
was an
;s of the
)ayment
's insolney Co.

ment to
btained

•

judgmen t against owner bee
faih1re to furnish · a liond ause of 0
. 1man, materia
·
to Pr ·
ma_tena
l man Was
.. o_\e,ct;.
preJudgment in terest from th
e.n.title<1'
notice to the owner for dem ~ da~" fi
~nd _not from the due date i::/f.Payrn;~8 ..;
in vo!ce, where at time the debate~ on th~.
credit was being extended to thet IV_as due.:
by the mate riahn an for alre d contractoe,
debts. Tripl e Supply, Inc. v
Past-<1/ l
Inc. (1982) 652 p 2d 1298.
· unset Raue /

of

I

\Y

Substantial performance.
'
Doctrine of substa ntia l ~e f
·'·
appl!cabl,e_.to this bond/ng st:i°:t_ance ia
he ating subcontract was su6s't anr 1• Where
ple ted on December 23 · 1968 f tia ly Corn.
.
. .
. •
• ac th t
minor item, a registe r represenr ··
a one
percent of the value of the su·· b ·. i9g -001!3&5
·
·
contra:-1
not furni shed un ti l February 19 1 ~ , wa,,
no~ extend the lim itation period f~~9 _d~•
action on bond. Carlisle v. Cox (1973) fili ng
136, 506 .p 2d 60:
. 29 U?.d

>tect mechanics and materiahnen, etc. •
Performance bond.
rity to
This section -provides no auth .'_·. ··
g party . award attorney fees to the prevaTority to
on tract in an action b~tween owners. and1 ~~~eiarty
:ontrac- a performance bond no t requ ired b Y ~n
th1s
chapter. Lignell 1•. Berg (1979) 593 p 2d Y
. 800.

TITLE 15
,1-

CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL

.L'!:,

r@hapter

· :{~~l. Interest.

\i~z.

Legal capacity of childr~n.
Prompt Paymen_t Act\ .
Th.-7. Registered Public Obhgat1ons Act.

5__6.
.j '

CH.APTER l
INTEREST
Section
15.1.1. Interest rates -' Legal rate - Contracte\i rate.
IS-1-4, Interest on-judgments .

.:15-1-1. Interest .rates-: Legal rate - Contract_ed rate. ill Except when par-.

ties to!! lawful contract agree on·!(specified rate Qf interest, the legal rate of. inter-

~ ·fo'r th.e _Joan or forbearance .of any money, goods, or [thlflgs] chose in action
be 10% per annum. [ ~· ~ hereift ~ slttttl] Nothing in this section mav be [se] construed [ftS] to in any way affect any penalty or interest charge
whichby law applies to delinquent or· other t axes or t o any. contract or obligations
made before [the ±4tll day ef] May 14, 1981.
(2)· The parties !Q !! lawful contract may agree upon ~ rate Qi interest for
t_hc lo~n Q!: forbearance of ~ money, goods, or chose l!! action.
·

sb'all

Hi story: ·L. 1907, ch. -46, § 1; C.L. 1907,
I 1241; C.L. 1917, § 3320; R.S. 1933; 44-0°1; L.
1935, ch. 42, § l ; C. 1943, 44-0-1; L. . 1981, ch.
73, § I; 1985, ch. 159, § 6.
.

•

Compiler's Notes.
· The 1981 amendment increased the rate in
the first sentence from 6% to 10%; and
changed the date at the end of the last se n. tence from 1907 t.o 1981.

.. 15-1-4. Interest on judgments. Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract
sliall conform thereto and shall. bear the interest agreed upon by the parties, which
shall be specified in the judgment; other judgments shall bear interest at the rate
of 12% per a nnum.
·
Hi&to r y: L. 190.7, ch. 46, § 11; C.L. 1907,
I 1241X9; C.L. 1917, § 3330; R.S. 1933' & C.
19~3, 44-0-4; L. 1981 , ch. 73,' § 2.
Compllcr's·Notcs.
The 1981 amendment increased · the interest rate from 8% to 12%.
Late payment of property division in
divorce action.
· Tliis section does not prohibit a district
court from imposing an interest rate of more

than eight percent for late payment of cash
ordered paid in a pr operty div isio n in a
divorce action where the prpperty d_iv ision
award. is reasonable and egui ta.ble. Pope v.
Po~ (1978) 589 P 2d 752.
Prejudgment interest.
Prejudgment interest is inappropriate as
to awards for mental anguish and ·punitive
damages. First Security Bank of Utah v.
J ,B.J.. Feedyards, Inc. (1982) 653 P 2d 591.
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TITLE 15

...'

·~ ; ·::

CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN

.

GENERAL

Chapter .
1. Interest.
2. Legal Capacity of Children.
3. Interparty Agreements.
4. Joint Obligations.
5. Revolving Charge Agreements [Repealed].
6. Prompt Payment Act.
7. Registered Public Obligations Act.
8. Utah Rental Purchase Agreement Act.
9. Uniform Athlete Agents Act.
10. Service Contracts Act.

CHAPTER 1
INTEREST
l

t-r.
~-

Section
15-1-3. Calculated by the year.
15-1-4. Interest on judgments.
15-1-5 to 15-1-10. Repealed.

Section
15-1-1.

Interest rates - Contracted rate Legal rate.
15-1-2, 15-l-2a. Repealed.

(
<:

I-

~
u"

inE

15-1-1. Interest rates - Contracted rate - Legal rate.
(1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for
the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action that is the
subject of their contract.
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the
legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose
in action shall be 10% per annum.
(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in any way to affect any
penalty or interest charge that by law applies to delinquent or other truces or
to any contract or obligations made before May 14, 1981.
History: L. 1907, ch. 46, § l; C.L. 1907,
§ 1241; C.L. 1917, § 3320; R.S. 1933, 44-0-1;
L, 1935, ch. 42, § 1; C. 1943, 44-0-1; L. 1981,
ch. 73, § l; 1985, ch. 169, § 6; 1989, ch. 79,
§ 1.
Cross-References. - Payment of interest
as extending statute of limitations , § 78B-2113.

Rate where unspecified in instrument, § 70A·
3-118.
.
'l'ime from which interest runs, § 70A-3-112Utah Consumer Credit Code,§ 70C-l-101 et
seq.
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